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 Electric Power grid cybersecurity is a topic gaining increased attention in 
academia, industry, and government circles, yet a method of quantifying and evaluating 
a system’s security is not yet commonly accepted.  In order to be useful, a quantification 
scheme must be able to accurately reflect the degree to which a system is secure, 
simply determine the level of security in a system using real-world values, model a wide 
variety of attacker capabilities, be useful for planning and evaluation, allow a system 
owner to publish information without compromising the security of the system, and 
compare relative levels of security between systems.  Published attempts at quantifying 
cybersecurity fail at one or more of these criteria.  This document proposes a new 
method of quantifying cybersecurity that meets those objectives.   This dissertation 
evaluates the current state of cybersecurity research, discusses the criteria mentioned 
previously, proposes a new quantification scheme, presents an innovative method of 
modeling cyber attacks, demonstrates that the proposed quantification methodology 
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2 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Cybersecurity is an area of ever increasing concern for all utility providers across 
North America.  Operators are becoming more reliant on the “smart grid” for improved 
operations and services.  This increased reliance makes it more vulnerable while, at the 
same time, it amplifies the potential consequences of a successful cyber-attack. 
 
1.1      Introduction [1] 
 This dissertation begins in Chapter 1 by discussing the Smart Grid and providing 
a brief overview of the importance of cybersecurity.  It proceeds to discuss cybersecurity 
fundamentals, using the example of a rural electric utility to provide context.  Once this 
background is presented, the core question of quantification is introduced.  Chapter 2 
proceeds to do a thorough literature review on the topic of cybersecurity as it relates to 
electrical power, and an even more thorough review on the published research 
surrounding quantification.  Chapter 3 presents a new approach to quantification, 
including a new model and methodology.  Chapter 4 describes the evaluation criteria 
used to validate the model.  A new methodology for simulating cyber attacks is 
presented, and the results of these simulations are compared to the evaluation criteria.  
Chapter 5 concludes this document by discussing the impact of the research and future 
research to be conducted. 
 
1.2     The Smart Grid 
 The North American electric power grid (grid) is becoming ever more reliant on 
the backbone of communications systems commonly called the Smart Grid.  Title XIII of 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) specifies the characteristics 
of Smart Grid.  They can be summarized as: 




 Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including 
renewable resources. 
 Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, 
and energy-efficiency resources.  
 Deployment of `smart' technologies for metering, communications concerning 
grid operations and status, and distribution automation. 
 Integration of `smart' appliances and consumer devices. 
 Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving 
technologies. 
 Provision to consumers of timely information and control options. 
 Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances 
and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving 
the grid. 
 Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption 
of smart grid technologies, practices, and services. [2] 
 The grid faces a variety of evolving and expanding threats, requiring a proactive 
response to develop robust, resilient networks.  In that vein, a great deal of guidance 
exists on how to provide proper cybersecurity for the Smart Grid.  Various agencies 
including the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC), the International Society of Automation (ISA), the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
(to name a few) have published guidance, frameworks, and standards attempting to 
address the issue. 
 Much of the efforts to investigate the cyber threat and cyber defenses have been 
hampered by an absence of standardized terminology, common understanding in 
defining the scope, and coordinated research efforts.  Cybersecurity itself has not been 
quantified in a standard way so as to allow measurement, testing, and comparison.  To 
that effect, increased collaboration and interconnection between academia, national 




 Inherently, the Power Grid uses equipment and architectures that distinguish it 
from more traditional communications networks.  This has a number of impacts. 
 First, the Power Grid has unique vulnerabilities: Almost by definition, the unique 
equipment in the grid provides unique opportunities for an attacker.  An example would 
be protective relays, devices that are not routinely used outside of the power industry.  
As with any other device containing software, electronics, and network connection, 
protective relays are vulnerable to unauthorized access and control.  The unique 
devices and software used in protective relaying warrant specific testing for 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
 While the Power Grid has unique vulnerabilities, it also has tools that augment its 
defensibility: The Power Grid has unique monitoring capabilities and physical 
characteristics that can enable improved detection and response.  For example, a 
poorly designed false data injection attack on a bus could be easily identified if it does 
not solve the power flow equations [3]. Further research into the capabilities and 
limitations of SCADA devices, synchrophasors, state estimation techniques, and other 
Power Grid-specific traits is required. 
 The Power Grid also has unique communications requirements: This can include 
very low data rate two-wire phone lines servicing a remote SCADA device, or a critical 
control link requiring sub-cycle latency for safety and operational regions, among others.  
In the first case, cybersecurity may not be required due to the lack of utility it provides 
an attacker [4].  In the latter case, the low latency requirements may eliminate the ability 
to use standard defensive schemes such as encryption, authentication, passwords, and 
firewalls, necessitating a more nuanced design.  
The Smart Grid is a network of networks: These networks include Transmission, 
Bulk Generation, Operations, Distribution, Marketing, the Service Provider, and the 
Customers [5]. NIST Interagency and Internal Report (NISTIR) 7628 provides a good 
visual description of the network interconnectivity, shown in Fig. 1 Each network is a 
unique security case.  For example, if the Customer network is compromised, there is 
potential for great economic damage but the grid will likely still function.  If the 




similar to the 2003 blackout.  Care must be taken in how these networks interact.  
Clearly, there is no need for the Bulk Generation and Service Provider networks to 
interact, and providing that connection would add a significant vulnerability to the 
networks.  Less obviously, regulatory requirements may prohibit the Marketing network 
from getting certain data from the Operations network.  The sheer complexity of the 
system warrants further research. 
 
Figure 1.1 Smart grid interconnected networks [5] 
 
1.3     Cybersecurity 
 The potential impact of an effective cyber-attack on the grid is extreme.  
Economically, outages and disturbances from all events cost at least $119 billion per year, 
and a single event (such as the 2003 blackout) can cost up to $6 billion [6] [7].  
Strategically, a United States Department of Defense (DoD) report in 2008 found that 
99% of DoD energy originates “outside the fence” and that insufficient backup capacity 
exists to ensure continuity in the event of an outage lasting several months [8].  
Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in 2009 that 31 of the 
DoD’s 34 most critical assets rely on commercial power as their primary source of 
electricity [9]. 
 In 2011, the commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 




reliability in the United States [10]. In 2012, Robert Mueller, the director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) projected that the cyber threat will surpass physical terrorist 
attacks as the “number one threat to the country” [11]. That same year, Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta described a cyber-attack on the power grid as a “cyber-Pearl Harbor” [12]. 
 A 2013 report found that “the electric grid is the target of numerous and daily cyber-
attacks.”  Several utilities in the report indicated that they were under “daily,” “constant,” 
or “frequent” attacks including probing attacks, phishing, and malware infection.  A single 
utility reported up to 10,000 attack attempts each month [11].   
 The volume and potential impact of the cyber threat is vast, and it is in the national 
interest to ensure that the grid is secured.  The threat exists at more than just the national 
level; attacks can occur against specific companies that can drastically affect the 
corporate operations.  On 22 November 2014, Sony Pictures suffered a cyber tack that 
“initially caused crippling computer problems for workers at Sony, who were forced to 
work with pen and paper.” [13] The attackers released confidential data that proved 
embarrassing to Sony, stole and released intellectual property on the internet, and caused 
a major operational disruption when Sony chose to not release a film in theaters as a 
result of the attack [13]. While not the same industry as rural power providers, this does 
indicate the potential impact that a cyber attack can have on a business. 
 Aside from the threat posed by an attack, small utilities must also ensure that they 
comply with the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards set by the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), as well as any applicable state and 
local standards.  Failure to comply with these standards can lead to fines or other punitive 
action, seriously affecting operations and the operator’s bottom line. 
 
1.4     Cybersecurity Fundamentals 
A thorough analysis of cybersecurity would be incomplete without presenting 
certain key concepts.  This is particularly important to avoid confusion, as certain words 
(such as “vector”) have different meanings based on the context.  This section will 





1.4.1  Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
 Cybersecurity can be summed up as a continuous process of assessing the 
network and implementing physical, technical, or policy controls that balance 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA).  Table 1.1 provides detailed definitions 
for each of these terms.  
 
Table 1.1 CIA Definitions [14] 
Term Definition 
Confidentiality “Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information”  
Integrity “Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and 
includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity”  
Availability “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information” 
 
Satisfying these three criteria is a constant balancing act because of their inter-
dependency, as an action to improve one trait may have a detrimental impact on the 
other two.  A simple example would be disconnecting a system from any other system, 
or “unplugging” it, and locking it in a room under guard.  This would maximize 
Confidentiality and Integrity, since nothing could possibly touch the system without 
alerting the guard.  It would drastically reduce availability and local access would be 
potentially inconvenient. 
A fourth factor that must always be considered is “Cost”.  Some systems 
legitimately require high levels of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.  An example 
would be some varieties of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).  Users can 
reasonably expect that their energy use and related billing are not publicly available 
(high Confidentiality).  Utilities and consumers must be certain that metering and billing 
information is accurate (high Integrity).  Some users, such as large industrial plants, 
may require billing information that is accurate up to the minute in order to minimize 




expensive system incorporating encrypted high speed data lines, secure data centers, 
and robust data backups to ensure that the high level of service is provided.  Figure 1.2 
shows this balance. 
Most other applications, however, allow for one or more of those criteria to be 
degraded in favor of the other(s).  The interfaces between control systems (e.g. relays) 
are a good example.  The information that those interfaces convey must be accurate in 
order for the operator to make the correct decision (high Integrity), and operators may 
need to respond to changes within minutes or seconds (high Availability).  The operator 
may not be concerned with anyone else seeing that same data (low Confidentiality), as 
long as standards for Integrity and Availability are met.  In this case, the utility may not 
need to use encrypted, secure, communication lines as long as the lines and sensors 
are reliable. 
For each system, the utility must examine its unique CIA requirements.  The 
above examples used a potentially over-simplified assessment process in order to 
demonstrate the concept.  A more formal method would be to examine the level of 
impact that a failure of that attribute will have on the overall system, the utility, and the 
customer.  A standard way of viewing these levels is to categorize them as Low, 









Table 1.2 Potential Impact Levels [5] 
Attribute Failure Impact Level 
Confidentiality Unauthorized disclosure Low: Limited impact 
Moderate: Serious impact 
High: Severe or catastrophic impact 
Integrity Unauthorized modification 
or destruction 
Low: Limited impact 
Moderate: Serious impact 
High: Severe or catastrophic impact 
Availability Disruption of Access Low: Limited impact 
Moderate: Serious impact 
High: Severe or catastrophic impact 
 
Another example may be illustrative at this point.  Most utilities have networks 
connecting their back offices that perform functions ranging from e-mail to timesheets to 
developing strategic business practices.  Unauthorized disclosure of this information 
could give competitors and unfair business advantage or could violate laws governing 
handling personal information.  At its most extreme, this could cause the utility to go 
bankrupt as competitors use this information to their own ends.  The potential impact is 
“severe or catastrophic,” so one would assess the Confidentiality impact level as “High.”  
Unauthorized modification or destruction of that data would most certainly be more than 
an inconvenience, and could potentially result in major problems such as accounting 
difficulties.  It is somewhat less likely to cause the utility to collapse, however, so the 
Integrity impact level would be “Moderate” (though there could be an argument for 
“High”).  Rarely, however, is this type of information needed within seconds.  A 
disruption in access would be an inconvenience, and could have an operational impact, 
but that impact would likely be limited.  For that reason, one would categorize the 
Availability impact level as “Low.” 
 These individual cases are for discussions only.  It is clear that there is no single 





1.4.2  Cybersecurity Core Functions 
The CIA model presented earlier serves as a model for why to guide a 
cybersecurity strategy.  The Core Functions, in turn, serve as a model for how one 
addresses the topic. 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) identifies five Core 
Functions that should be considered when building a cybersecurity strategy: Identify, 
Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.  Each is defined in Table 1.3. 
 The purpose of cybersecurity is to continuously ensure the required level of 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.  This is done by “Identifying” risk, assets, data, 
and capabilities, “Protecting” the infrastructure from attack, “Detecting” and 
“Responding” to any attack, and “Recovering” from the incident. Each of these concepts 
is defined in Table 1.3. 
 These functions will be continuous and simultaneous; however, when initially 
facing the task, Identify serves as the preferred starting point. The utility provider will 
perform a thorough risk analysis and examine its existing systems.  Of the core 
functions, this is the most critical, as it forms the base upon which the others reside.  An 
immaculate protection scheme with the best sensors and the best personnel able to 
respond to and recover from a threat can be rendered moot if the vulnerability attacked 
is unknown, or if the capabilities of the attacker are underestimated.  This continuous 
process is shown in Figure 1.4.    
 In order to understand these functions, one must understand the Risk 
Assessments, Adversaries, and Controls.  The Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu 
said, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles.” [15]  Thus, as part of the Identify function, the utility operator must 
understand potential adversaries as well as they understand their own systems.  The 
first step in this process is to conduct a thorough risk assessment as described in Table 
1.3.  
 Risk (R) is a function of Threats (T), Vulnerabilities (V), and Consequences (C) 





 = ∗ ∗  (1.1) 
 
 T and V are probabilities.  T is the probability that a Threat exists, is capable of 
conducting an effective attack, and is actively conducting said attack.  V is the probability 
that a Vulnerability exists that can be exploited by a particular Threat.  R and C are in 
units of value, such as dollars or hours.  This simple equation would be applied multiple 
times for each unique Threat, Vulnerability, or Consequence. 
 Consider a very simple example.  Figure 1.3 shows a utility that has two vulnerable 
breakers that could be attacked. There are two threats to those breakers: external 
hackers and disgruntles employees.  Each breaker has consequences in terms of down 
time and financial cost in terms of lost income when the downstream customers are not 






Figure 1.3 Simple Power System 
 
 Delving into statistical values, crime reports, internal assessments, and a few 
guesses, the utility determines probabilities and values for the variables.  It determines 
that the Threat probability of an external hacker is 80%, and the Threat probability of a 
disgruntled employee is 20%.  The Vulnerability probability for breaker A to a hacker is 
5%, and to a disgruntled employee is 40%.  For breaker B, those values are 3% and 30%, 
respectively.  The Consequences for Relay A are $1,000 and 1 hour, and for breaker B 
are $500 and 2 hours.    The utility then develops Table 1.5, where each cell shows the 
quantified Risk. 
 In this example, the greatest financial risk to the utility is a disgruntled employee 




disgruntled employee attacking breaker B.  This knowledge will allow the utility to 
develop a rationale for cybersecurity strategy that addresses the greatest risks.   
 
Table 1.3 Core Functions [17] 
Term Definition 
Identify “Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to 
systems, assets, data, and capabilities.” 
Protect “Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of 
critical infrastructure services.”  
Detect “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the occurrence 
of a cybersecurity event.”  
Respond “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a 
detected cybersecurity event.”  
Recover “Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for 
resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due 
to a cybersecurity event.”  
 
 







Table 1.4 Risk [18] 
Term Definition 
Risk (R) “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, 
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the 
associated consequences”  
Threat (T) “natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that 
has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, 
the environment and/or property”  
Vulnerability (V) “physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open 
to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard”  
Consequence (C) “effect of an event, incident, or occurrence”  
 
  Often, however, that level of data is unknown when conducting the assessment.  
A much simpler solution is to simply plan for the worst case scenario and the most likely 
scenario.  The United States Marine Corps calls these the enemy’s Most Likely Course 
of Action (MLCOA) and the enemy’s Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA).  This 
is a much more subjective methodology, but has the advantage of being fast and 
reasonably accurate. 
 
Table 1.5 Risk Assessment Example 
  Breaker A Breaker B 
  5% Vulnerable to Hacker 3% Vulnerable to Hacker 
  
40% Vulnerable to 
Employee 30% Vulnerable to Employee 
  Cost Time Cost Time 
 Threat $1,000  1 $500  2hr 
Hacker 80% $40.00  0.040 $12.00  0.048hr 





 In the prior example, the utility may believe that the most likely threat will come 
from an outside hacker attempting to control breaker A in order to cause chaos.  This 
would be the MLCOA.  The utility may also know that load A is a large population, but 
breaker B is at a remote substation and difficult to repair quickly.  Additionally, the utility 
knows that many of its employees have physical and electronic access to the substation 
equipment, and so are much more likely to be successful if they attack.  If the utility cares 
more about having minimal downtime than its bottom line, the MDCOA would be a 
disgruntled employee attacking breaker B. 
 Since each Core Function is considered continuously, it is likely that a utility may 
begin with a simple MLCOA/MDCOA assessment and, as more information is gathered, 
refine the assessment by quantifiably assessing risk.  This, in fact, is precisely what the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did when assessing the risk of a terrorist attack 
[16].  From 2001 to 2003, Risk was simply equal to population.  Looked at simply, 
terrorists are more likely to attack a large population center, and the potential 
consequences for a large population center were greatest.  Therefore, both the MLCOA 
and MDCOA were an attack on a large population center.  In time, DHS refined their 
definition until they could more accurately quantify the total Risk. 
 A key component of the Identify function is to recognize one’s adversaries.  Table 
1.6 shows a list of potential candidates.  These include external and insider threats, 
individuals and organizations, those motivated by politics, finances, or personal reasons, 
and unintentional threats.  In short, the number and variety of threats are staggering.  
Despite this, it is extremely helpful to understand what threats may be most pertinent to 
the particular target, in order to develop the proper cybersecurity strategy.  
 Consider the example of a disgruntled employee.  There are several unique 
concerns with this type of adversary.  The first is the status as an insider threat.  The 
disgruntled employee will be unidentified and unidentifiable.  He or she   will have access 
to internal networks and physical access to facilities.  This adversary can cause immense 
harm based on knowledge of the utility’s inner workings. 
 There are several actions a utility may take just to mitigate the risk posed by a 




when an employee is terminated, technical limitations requiring two employees to 
authenticate certain commands, and a badging system that keeps employees to physical 
areas where they are required to work and no others.  These controls have great 
applicability to this adversary, yet almost no applicability to hackers, for example. 
The previous section indicated a few actions that a utility may take to mitigate the risk 
posed by a particular adversary.  In cybersecurity, any action taken to mitigate a risk is 
called a Control.  They may be physical, technical, or administrative in nature.  Physical 
controls include fences, locks, keying and badging systems, and security cameras.  
Technical controls include passwords, biometric identification, firewalls, and encryption.  
Administrative controls include a good cybersecurity strategy, policies, plans, and 
procedures. 
 Controls are how one executes the Core Functions of Protect, Detect, Respond, 
and Recover.   
 When implementing controls, one must ensure that they address the assessed risk 
and provide the proper levels of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability.  Consider an 
interface between a transmission network and a distribution network.  The utility assessed 
the system and determined that the required level of Confidentiality was Low, the required 
Integrity was High, and the required Availability was High.  The MLCOA was a competitor 
would attempt to gain an unfair advantage by looking into the utility’s operations, and the 
MDCOA was a terrorist attack trying to bring down the transmission system and sending 
North America in to the Stone Age.  Any controls used must address these risks and 
service levels.  An overzealous security engineer may completely disconnect the interface 
from the network, requiring that a technician be physically located at the interface inside 
a locked room with an armed guard in order to defend against the potentially catastrophic 
MDCOA.  Such a decision, however, would fail to meet the high level of Availability 
required.  
 Examples of controls include the following: [19] 
 Inventory of authorized and unauthorized devices 




 Secure configurations for hardware and software on mobile devices, laptops, 
workstations, and servers 
 Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation 
 Malware defenses 
 Application software security 
 Wireless access control 
 Data recovery capability 
 Security skills assessment and appropriate training to fill gaps 
 Secure configurations for network devices such as firewalls, routers, and switches 
 Limitation and control of network ports, protocols, and services 
 Controlled use of administrator privileges 
 Boundary defense 
 Maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of audit logs 
 Controlled access based on need to know 
 Account monitoring and control 
 Data protection 
 Incident response and management 
 Secure network engineering 
 Penetration tests and red team exercises 
 
 The categories of controls (Physical, Technical, and Administrative) also apply to 
the different categories of attack vectors.  An attack vector is simply the route by which 
an adversary can access a system.  Physical vectors include doors, windows, and 
physical hardware such as laptops. A technical vector may be a flaw in computer code, a 
weak password, or an open port on a firewall.  An administrative vector may be a allowing 






Table 1.6 Adversaries [5] 
Adversary  Description  
Nation States  “State-run, well organized and financed. Use foreign service agents 
to gather classified or critical information from countries viewed as 
hostile or as having an economic, military or a political advantage.” 
Hackers  “A group of individuals (e.g., hackers, phreakers, crackers, trashers, 
and pirates) who attack networks and systems seeking to exploit the 
vulnerabilities in operating systems or other flaws.” 
Terrorists/  
Cyberterrorists  
“Individuals or groups operating domestically or internationally who 
represent various terrorist or extremist groups that use violence or 
the threat of violence to incite fear with the intention of coercing or 
intimidating governments or societies into succumbing to their 
demands.” 
Organized Crime  “Coordinated criminal activities including gambling, racketeering, 
narcotics trafficking, and many others. An organized and well-
financed criminal organization.” 
Other Criminal 
Elements  
“Another facet of the criminal community, which is normally not well 
organized or financed. Normally consists of few individuals, or of one 
individual acting alone.” 
Industrial 
Competitors  
“Foreign or domestic corporations operating in a competitive market 
and engaged in illegal information gathering from competitors or 
foreign governments in the form of corporate espionage.” 
Disgruntled  
Employees  
“Angry, dissatisfied individuals with the potential to inflict harm on 
the Smart Grid network or related systems. This can represent an 
insider threat depending on the current state of the individual’s 
employment and access to the systems.”  
Careless/ Poorly  
Trained 
Employees  
“Those users who, either through lack of training, lack of concern, or 
lack of attentiveness pose a threat to Smart Grid systems. This is 




1.4.3  Rural Electric Case Study 
 Consider the case of a rural electric provider using a legacy metering system.  The 
utility operator has a good understanding of the metering system and its capabilities.  The 
first thing the operator does is to assess the required levels of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability required by the system. 
 The consequences of unauthorized modification or destruction of the metering 
data could include mass theft of service and economic collapse for the company; 
therefore, High Integrity is required.  The information contained in the system, however, 
would not be of any particular use to anyone except the utility.  The consequences of 
unauthorized disclosure are limited, so the Confidentiality requirement is Low.  Likewise, 
the utility only requires information from the meters once a month or so, with some 
flexibility as to when that information is accessed.  A disruption of access would only have 
limited impact, so the required level of Availability is Low. 
 The utility has determined that two main adversaries exist: criminal elements 
attempting to steal power, and disgruntled employees attempting to damage the 
company.  An initial assessment shows that the MLCOA is a power thief attacking one 
meter and stealing power for up to a year, and the MDCOA is a disgruntled employee 
bringing down the entire metering network for up to two weeks. 
 In addition to the MLCOA/MDCOA analysis, the company has collected incident 
data over the past 20 years.  Using that historical data, the company determines that the 
Threat of a power thief is 2% and there is a 0.25% threat of a disgruntled employee.  The 
probability of Vulnerability for a power thief is 1% and 25% for the disgruntled employee.  
The Consequences for a successful power thief are $500, and the Consequences for the 
disgruntled employee are up to $100,000.  The quantified Risk for the power thief is 
therefore $0.10 and the quantified Risk for the disgruntled employee is $62.50.   
 When balancing Risk and the required levels of service, the utility decides that the 
Risk of the power thief does not warrant major controls.  The utility decides to use Physical 
controls of sealed metal boxes at the meters and communications junctures, but not to 
use any specific Technical controls outside the data center, beyond the simple suite 




required, though, the utility implements a robust storage and protection scheme on its 
servers, and has monthly reviews of the collected data to look for discrepancies.  The 
boxes and limited security suite Protect the network, while random visual checks on meter 
boxes will Detect a problem.  The data storage and protection scheme allows the utility 
to Respond to and Recover from an incident. 
 To address the relatively high risk of a disgruntled employee, the utility implements 
several policies to monitor network activity (Detect), require two-person authentication to 
perform any configuration changes on the metering network (Protect), limit administrator 
privileges (Protect), lock down unused ports (Protect), and to provide off-site backup data 
storage (Respond and Recover).   
 
1.5     Cybersecurity Quantification [20] 
Multiple sources identify quantification as a key question facing cybersecurity 
researchers.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that Enterprise Level 
Metrics are a “current hard problem in INFOSEC Research,” and that “Defining effective 
metrics for information security (and for trustworthiness more generally) has proven very 
difficult, even though there is general agreement that such metrics could allow 
measurement of progress in security measures and at least rough comparisons 
between systems for security. Metrics underlie and quantify progress in all other 
roadmap topic areas.” [21]  Yardley, et al. state that “The testing effort alone is 
challenging due to … a prescribed way to quantify security combined with the constantly 
evolving threat landscape. To close that gap, applied research and methods are needed 
to improve security quantification and rigorous security assessment, not only for single 
components but also for complex systems in which heterogeneous components 
constantly interact.” [4]  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) says 
that “security is not absolute, and quantifying cybersecurity is already a hard problem.” 
[22] A group of senior corporate security officers identified security metrics as one of 
their top 3 security requirements. [23]  In a whitepaper, RAND states that “most 
attempts to develop effective measures of cybersecurity have failed” [24].  Byres further 




to comprehend, comparative, and possible to combine separate sub-values [25].  
Johnson and Goetz Identify “finding ways to effectively measure security and quantify if 
security is improving” as one of “three major areas in which security executives can 
make a significant impact in transforming their organizations” [26].  
The following chapter provides a detailed review of cybersecurity quantification 





4 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The most commonly published approach to quantification in literature is 
Probabilistic.  Additionally, DHS categorizes other approaches into five general 
categories: Measures of effectiveness, Ideal-based metrics, Goal-oriented metrics, 
Quality of Protection, and Adversary-based metrics [21].  
 
2.1     Probabilistic / Stochastic Methods 
Many attempts to solve this problem have been published in the literature.  The 
most common approach is Probabilistic.  This approach is to model the state of the 
target system and address the probability of being in said state and the probability of 
transitioning to another state.  The idea is that a user can thereby use those 
probabilities to determine the relative security of a system. 
 
2.1.1   Mean Time To Security Failure 
Madan, et al. propose a method of quantifying security, using the value of Mean 
Time To Security Failure (MTTSF).  To understand this, one must look at the Markov 
chain and it’s embedded Discrete Time Markov Process, as shown in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2. [27] 
The authors do a thorough derivation, but the end result is 
 = ℎ + ℎ� + ℎ + ℎ + ℎ − −−  (2.1) 
 
 Where: ℎ� is the mean sojourn time in state �, and � is the probability of being in 
state �.  
 This model relies on the various probabilities being determined experimentally. 
Once they are calculated, it is possible to display MTTSF as a function of  




time spent in a known good state to the probability of attack.  These are the two 
variables that will not be governed by system architecture. 
 Trivedi, et al used a probabilistic method to investigate SITAR (Scalable Intrusion 
Tolerant Architecture) an intrusion tolerant system [28] [29] [30]. 
 
 















2.1.2  Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a well-established method of quantifying 
risk that has been used in a variety of applications [31]. PRA is a five step process, and 
can be executed at three levels of rigor, as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 PRA Steps [31]  











1 Accident frequency analysis Yes Yes Yes 
2 Accident progression analysis  Yes Yes 
3 Source-term analysis  Yes Yes 
4 Offsite consequence analysis   Yes 
5 Risk calculation Yes Yes Yes 
 
Each step consists of a number of analyses, a thorough exploration of which 
would require the bulk of this paper.  For example, Figure 2.3 shows the process of 
conducting a Level 1 PRA.  The important application to the topic at hand is the 
introduction of event trees, which serve as a basis for determining the probability of a 
particular outcome.  Each begins with an Initiating Event.  The possible responses to 
that event determine the possible outcomes.  
For example, consider an analysis of a pipe burst at a nuclear reactor.  The burst 
pipe is the initiating event.  The next question is if electric power is available, which is 
necessary for all responses.  If electric power is available, the outcome falls to whether 
the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) functions.  If the ECCS functions, a 
problem can still occur if the fission product removal system fails.  Even if it functions, a 
failure can occur if containment integrity breaks down.  The corresponding severity of 




each result can then be calculated.  This process can be summarized in the event tree 
below.  
 Lin, et al. and Yu, et al. applied this approach to cybersecurity for the power grid.  
[32] [33] 
  
2.1.3  Vulnerability Graphs 
 Li, et al. introduce a graphical model called “Vulnerability Graphs” that works with 
a stochastic process to quantify security [34].  Vulnerability graphs have been previously 
explored in literature [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40], and essentially represent the results of 
a vulnerability scan of a system.  The sample vulnerability graph in Figure 2.4 shows the 
evolution of a network from a secure state to a compromised state. 
 





Figure 2.4 Sample Vulnerability Graph [34] 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Sample Event Tree [31] 
 
 The authors proceed to overlay a stochastic process atop the graph, which 
represents the “probability that a randomly picked node is compromised when the 
system enters its steady state” (emphasis in original) [34].   
 As with MTTSF and many approaches to quantification, this one assumes 
historical or experimental data to determine state and transition probabilities.  This is an 




values.  Ye, et al used the approach to detect a cyber-attack, and found it to lack 
robustness for that reason [41]. 
 The authors claim a number insights with practical significance; however, 
understanding their observations requires an understanding of mathematics that a 
typical user would not have.  For example, they suppose that someone attempting to 
use this method would know what an “Erdos-Renyi random graph” is, without defining it.  
This limits its practicality.  Probably the most useful of these observations is that, all 
other things equal, a node with fewer connections to other nodes is more secure than a 
node with more connections. 
 
2.1.4 Mean Time to Compromise 
Byres addresses the requirement for experimental data directly by proposing 
Mean Time To Compromise (MTTC) [25] [42] [43].   Additionally, the authors raise at 
least three key applications for a quantification methodology: deciding between security 
measures, justifying security measures to superiors, and comparing security between 
systems.  They further state criteria that a quantification methodology should meet: 
understandable by management and users, represent a single number, aggregate 
separate sub-values, and be able to compare systems.   
 MTTC is an adaptation of the method that Underwriter Laboratories uses to rate 
the security level of safes [44].  A sample rating that a safe may receive is: 
TXTL-60X6





Figure 2.6 Sample Safe Rating 
 
The authors propose quantifying the system based on the amount of time 
necessary for a beginner, intermediate, or expert adversary to conduct a successful 






Figure 2.7 State-space Model for MTTC [25] 
 
Table 2.2 shows example state dwell times for each state: 
 
Table 2.2 MTTC Example State Dwell Times [25] 
 State Times (Days) 
Skill Level B P C I A 
Expert 4.6 2.9 1.0 4.8 1.0 
Intermediate 5.2 3.3 1.0 5.3 1.0 
Beginner 9.5 7.3 1.0 10.3 1.0 
 
Each state change from Launch to Success has a certain probability, much like in 
the Markov chains of MTTSF.  From those state changes, the state dwell times, and the 
various path options from B to P, the user can calculate the MTTC. 
 
2.1.5  Time To Compromise 
 McQueen, et al. present Time to Compromise (TTC), which has significant 
similarities to MTTC [45].  As with Byres, et al. in MTTC, they consider multiple skill 




fourth level, “Novice,” in addition to those in MTTC.  They calculated the mean number 
of attempts necessary to compromise a system based on those attacker skill levels and 
compared to the total pool of vulnerabilities, as shown in Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 
 
 











Figure 2.10 TTC for Various Vulnerability Pools [45] 
 
2.2     Measures of Effectiveness 
A measure of effectiveness functions by taking an action intended to reduce risk 
and measure the results.  The only example of this approach in literature was 
conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses as part of a DHS pilot program [46].  In 
this project, Simpson, et al. established fifteen Cyber Defense Configurations (CDCs), 
essentially scenarios around a network configuration.  The CDCs are described in 
Figure 2.11 
The authors established three Threats.  Threat 1 is a small group of adversaries 
with limited capabilities and time.  Threat 2 still has limited capabilities, but has a large 
amount of time to conduct the attack.  Threat 3 is a large, capable, coordinated effort 
such as a nation state.  They then calculated the probability of a successful defense for 
each CDC against each threat, as displayed on the following page. 
These probabilities were, effectively, educated guesses.  The inherent 
subjectivity limits the application; however, the relative strengths should be of value.  In 
short, this approach establishes a baseline network, applies certain defenses to the 






Figure 2.11 CDC Buildup [46] 
 
 




2.3   Ideal Based Metrics 
Ideal-based metrics compare the system to some ideal, such as a system with no 
vulnerabilities.  Another example would be a system with no attack vectors or no 
adversaries conducting attacks. 
 
2.3.1  Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
An ideal-based metric with some level of industry acceptance is the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [47].  Each vulnerability has a variety of metrics 
described in Table 2.3. 
 Each metric has a value, generally ranging from 0 to 1, that corresponds to the 
levels associated with the metrics.  A high value corresponds with a vulnerability that is 
easier to compromise.   
 For each metric, CVSS includes detailed instructions in how to assign it a level.  
Figure 2.13 is the flow chart to decide the attack complexity level, for example. 
 
  
Figure 2.13 CVSS Attack Vector Flow Chart [48] 
 
 The metrics in Table 2.3 are combined in a variety of scores, summarized in 
Table 2.5.  The base score ranges from 0 to 10 and evaluates the metrics of the 
vulnerability.  The temporal score considers the availability of code or exploitation 
techniques. The environmental score considers the importance of the vulnerable asset. 
The following example is for the DNS Kaminsky Bug (designated by NIST as 





Table 2.3 CVSS Metrics [47] 
Variable Metric Levels 
v Attack vector Network, Adjacent Network, Local, Physical 
c Complexity Low, High 
p Privilege required None, Low, High 
u User interaction required Yes, No �  Impact on confidentiality None, Low, High �� Impact on integrity None, Low, High �  Impact on availability None, Low, High 
e Exploitability Unproven, Proof of Concept, Functional, High 
r Remediation level Official Fix, Temporary Fix, Workaround, 
Unavailable 
rc Report confidence Unknown, Reasonable, Confirmed 
 Security requirement for 
confidentiality 
Low, Medium, High 
� Security requirement for 
integrity 
Low, Medium, High 
 Security requirement for 
availability 
Low, Medium, High 
 
 Using the values assigned in [47], the Base, Temporal, an Environmental values 
can then be calculated. 
CVSS has been examined frequently in literature.  Cheng et al examined how to 
scale CVSS from small systems to a larger network [51]. Mell et al discuss CVSS as a 
potential security standard within the software industry [52].  Premaratne, et al. point out 
a weakness in the applicability of CVSS to power systems, namely that it considers only 
vulnerabilities associated with computers and computer networks, not Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IEDs) [53]. Lai and Hsia use CVSS to improve the security of an 




Table 2.4 CVSS Example Metrics [50] 
Metric Value Comments 
Attack Vector Network The attacker is sending the packets over the network. 
Attack Complexity High The attacker must configure an authoritative source 
with a public IP to be routed to by the recursive server. 
The attacker must also beat a race condition to 
successfully exploit (regardless of how quick that race 
condition may occur). 
Privileges Required None  
User Interaction None  
Scope Changed The vulnerable component is the DNS server. The 
impacted component is the victim system who is 
unknowingly re-directed to unintended network 
locations based on the malicious DNS answers. 
Confidentiality 
Impact 
None Any confidentiality is secondary. 
Integrity Impact High The victim user has trusted a poisoned cache and is 
being directed to any destination the attacker wishes. 










Table 2.5 CVSS Scores [47] 
Score Conditions Value �  All − [ − � ∗ − �� ∗ − � ] 
Impact Scope 
unchanged 
. ∗  �  
Scope 
changed 
. ∗ � − . − . ∗  � − .  
Exploitability All . ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  
Base Impact ≤ 0  
Scope 
unchanged 
min [ � + � � � , ] 
Scope 
changed 
min [ . ∗ � + � � � , ] 





. ∗  � � �  
Scope 
changed 
. ∗ � � − . − .∗  (� � � − . )  
Modified 
Exploitability 
All . ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗  
Environmental Impact ≤ 0  
Scope 
unchanged 
min [ � �  � + � �  � � � ∗∗ ∗ , ] 
Scope 
changed 
min [ . � �  � + � �  � � �∗ ∗ ∗ , ] 




2.3.2  VEA-bility 
 Tupper, et al. propose VEA-bility to building on CVSS [53] [55].  VEA-bility 
considers a network’s relative security in relation to vulnerability (V), exploitability (E), 
and attackability (A).  V is based on CVSS Impact and Temporal scores.  E is based on 
the CVSS Exploitability score. A depends on attack graphs (an adversary-based 
metric).  They are related as follows for a given vulnerability, v: 
 
 � � = − + +  (2.2) 
 = min , ln ∑  (2.3) 
 =  � +  (2.4) 
 =  min , ln ∑ � � � � ∗ ℎ  (2.5) 
 
 where hs = services in the system, and ns = services communicating over the 
network, and 
 =  ∗  ∑  ℎ∑  ℎ  (2.6) 
 
2.3.3  Other Ideal-based Metrics 
CVSS is not the only approach using ideal-based metrics.  Ganame and 
Bourgeois use the ideal of “no threat” and set three levels based on the deviation from 
that norm: Green, Orange, and Red, corresponding to “no threat,” “non-critical threat,” 
and “active intrusion” [56]. Hahn and Govindarasu use the ideal of “no exposure,” which 
is similar to “no vulnerability,” but also considers a state where vulnerabilities are not 
exposed to specific adversaries [57]. Tague, et al specifically compare the 
vulnerabilities of wireless networks to and ideal of “no vulnerabilities” [58]. Ten, et al 
specifically address vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. [59] Wang, et al propose a 
metric for handling zero-day software vulnerabilities, with an ideal of an infinite number 




McQueen discuss seven security ideals within the dimensions of the Security Group’s 
knowledge, Attack Group’s knowledge, Access, Vulnerabilities, Damage potential, 
Detection, and Recovery [61] [62] [63]. 
 
2.4  Goal Oriented Metrics 
Goal-oriented metrics identify a goal and then measure progress toward that 
goal.  Per [21], goal-oriented metrics are used in software engineering, and it appears to 
have been used for that application in the past [64] [65] .  A thorough search of literature 
found no reference to goal-oriented metrics by that name relating to cybersecurity.  For 
that reason, this section is only included to follow the framework laid out in [21]. 
 
2.5  Quality of Protection 
 The Department of Homeland Security identifies Quality of Protection (QoP) as 
an approach to quantifying cybersecurity; however, references in literature dealing with 
QoP and cybersecurity are scant [21].  Gerstel and Sasaki discuss its application to 
optical networks [66].  Their approach is to prioritize traffic based on the level of 
protection required, similar to Quality of Service in network applications.  These 
priorities called Reliability of Service (RoS) classes, described Table 2.6 
 
Table 2.6 RoS Classes [66] 
RoS Class Description 
Guaranteed Protection 99.999% protection in the transport layer 
Best Effort Protection Uses less protection bandwidth 
Unprotected Traffic No effort at the transport layer to protect the connection in 
case of failure 
Preemtable Traffic Traffic that uses protection bandwidth 
 
  A series of workshops were held to discuss the topic; however, they ceased in 
2009 [67].  Atzeny and Lioy propose criteria to be used to evaluate a metric [68]: 




 Objectiveness: the measurement should not be influenced by the measurer 
 Repeatability: the measurement should yield the same result in the same 
circumstances 
 Easiness: using the measurement should not require excessive effort 
 Succinctness: the measurement should only consider relevant information 
In short, this approach appears to have been abandoned in literature. 
 
2.6  Information and Game Theory 
Information and Game Theory approaches to quantification are quite popular in 
academia; however, it is an approach with little potential for real-world usability.  It will 
only be addressed briefly in this document.  Amin, et al use game theory to estimate 
security risks to cyber-physical systems [69]. Law, et al apply game theory to bridge 
cybersecurity and Automatic Generation Control [70]. Zonouz, et al use game theory to 
respond and recover to intrusions [71]. Bloch, et al address security for wireless 
networks using information theory and determine average secure communications rates 
and outage probability [72].  Pasqualetti and Zhu use information theory to optimize 
system security [73].  Zonouz, et al use information theory to evaluate the relative level 
of importance of intrusions [74]. 
 
2.7  Adversary Based Metrics 
Adversary-based metrics attempt to quantify how difficult it is for an adversary to 
complete some task.  Examples include time, resources, steps, and attempts 
necessary.   
 
2.7.1  Attack Graphs 
 Idika and Bhargava, among others, use attack graphs (which track how an 
attacker can leverage vulnerabilities) to determine the most relevant metric to a system 









Figure 2.14 Simple Attack Graph 
 
The starting location for the attacker is s, and the target, compromised state, is g.  
v1, v2, and v3 denote vulnerabilities exploited and c1 is another host in the system.   
There are a number of approaches to quantifying security using attack graphs.  
Per Idika and Bhargava, two of them do not analyze the path taken in the attack graph.  
Network Compromise Percentage (NCP), proposed by Lippmann, et al. which identifies 
what fraction of a network can be compromised (as defined by an adversary gaining 
permissions to access a host) [76].  Using the notation presented,  
 
 � = ∗ ∑ .∈∑ ℎ.ℎ∈  (2.7) 
 
where H is the set of hosts, C ⊆ H is the subset of hosts that the attacker can 




Other attack graph based metrics look the route taken.  The shortest route 
between g and s is the Shortest Path metric [77] [78].  Using the example in Figure 
2.14, the Shortest Path is s-v1-g, of length l = 2, so the shortest path metric, SP(G) = 2.  
Variants on this approach have addressed the effort required to exploit vulnerabilities in 
terms of time and resources [79] [80] [81].  
The Number of Paths metric considers, cleverly enough, the number of possible 
paths [78].  In the case of the example above, there are two paths: s-v1-g and s-v2-c1-
v3-g, so the Number of Paths metric, NP(G) = 2.  
The Mean of Path Lengths Metric is, simply, the average path length [75] [82].  In 
the example above, s-v1-g is of length 2 and s-v2-c1-v3-g is of length 4, so the Mean 
Path Length metric, � = ∑� = . 
Idika and Bhargava extend these approaches to add Normalized Mean Path 
Length, Standard Deviation of Path Length, Mode of Path Lengths, and Median of Path 
Lengths as metrics.  They develop an algorithm to determine how to combine the 
metrics in the most useful way.  This allows two attack graphs to be compared and to 
state which of the two situations is most secure [75]. 
Wang, et al. expand on this approach to consider unknown vulnerabilities [60]. 
 
2.7.2  Petri Nets 
 Chen, et al use Petri nets (a type of attack tree) to model attacks on the power 
grid [83].  A Petri net is a graphical and mathematical method of modeling a variety of 
systems.  It includes places (P), transitions (T), flow relationships (F), weight functions 
(W), and an initial state (M0) [84].  Additionally, Petri nets use tokens to indicate the 
current state (M). The authors present a Petri net to describe a mix of cyber and 
physical transitions that occurred around the 2003 Northeast blackout. 
For this example, a cyber transition is anything that occurs in the control system, 
and a physical transition is any physical occurrence. 
P1 is the initial state.  T1 represents the first generating unit tripping, which led to 
the generator being shut down in state P2.  T2 is the failure of the alarm system to warn 




first transmission line tripping, leading to increased load on the remaining lines in state 
P4.  T4 occurred when the subtransmission lines became overloaded and tripped.  P5 
reflects the loss of those lines.  T5 is the overload and tripping of the final transmission 
line, leading to blackout in P6. 
 
 
Figure 2.15 Petri Net Example [83] 
 
The authors modeled an attack on a smart meter using a variety of cyber and 
physical methods.   
 
 




T1 through T5 and P1 through P4 represent the adversary gaining physical access 
to the smart meter.  T6 and T7 give the adversary access to the smart meter’s firmware 
in P5.  The adversary cracks the firmware in T8, gaining access to the smart meter’s 
cryptographic keys in P6.  The oval in Figure 2.16 highlights the process of actually 
exploiting the smart meter. 
Unfortunately, the authors never validated the approach beyond a “proof-of-
concept” program in Python. 
Liu, et al. use attack graphs and a concept called Multiple Criteria Decision 
Making (MCDM) to conduct a security assessment of a power system [85].  MCDM is a 
collection of methods used to make decisions that balance multiple objectives.  Liu, et 
al. use two of these methods: analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and Technique for 
Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS).  AHP prioritizes the 
various criteria [86].  TOPSIS states ideals for each criteria and compares the 
aggregate geometric distance for the criteria from the ideal [87].  Liu, et al. apply attack 
graphs to the problem of vulnerabilities in the system due to device interconnection, and 
MCDM to quantify the level of security.   
The authors evaluated a case study of a transmission substation.  They first 
evaluated the various security countermeasures (C1 to C6) implemented in the 
substation. 
 
Table 2.7 Security Countermeasures [85] 
Number Security Countermeasure 
C1 Intrusion detection system on communications network 
C2 Security expansion for internal networks 
C3 PKI certificate and access control 
C4 Remote connections via Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
C5 Network scan and patches 





They proceeded to develop a hierarchy to evaluate a number of attack methods, 
calculated the system vulnerability, and determined the impact of the resources 
available to an attacker to the vulnerability of the system. 
 
 
Figure 2.17 Attack Method Development [85] 
 
They developed three defense schemes and compared them to the baseline.  
Scheme 1 included C1, C2, and C4.  Scheme 2 included C3, C5, and C6.  Scheme 3 
included all countermeasures, C1-C6.  The results below show that, for a given amount 
of resources available to an attacker, the vulnerability decreases with the addition of the 
countermeasures. 
 
2.7.3  Vulnerability Index 
Srivastagva, et al. propose a vulnerability index for specific nodes and 
interconnections in the network [88]. The index looks at five criteria: 
Discovery (d): (0=not discovered, 1=discovered) this shows whether an attacker 
can find the device or link in question.  For example, for an Ethernet connection, it 





Figure 2.18 Impact of Countermeasures [85] 
 
Access (a): (0=not accessible, 1=accessible) this indicates whether an attacker 
can use the targeted device.  It is dependent upon the attacker’s skill level and the 
specifics of the device. 
Feasibility (f): (0=not feasible 1=feasible) Feasibility requires that the attacker 
have knowledge of the device’s manufacturer and model number, that the device has 
vulnerabilities known to the attacker. 
Detection Threat (t): (0=no threat, 1=low threat, 2=high threat) this is the 
probability of an attack being detected, and is dependent upon the duration of 
penetration required to execute the attack and the type of communications link.  
Communications Speed (s): (0=less than 1,200bps, 1=2,400-19,200 bps, 





 The vulnerability index (v) is then calculated as: 
 
 = ∗ ∗ ∗ − +  (2.8) 
 
 This will give each node a vulnerability rating of 0 to 5.  The higher the vulnerability 
rating, the more vulnerable it is to attack. 
This method of “quantifying” security is not a truly quantitative evaluation, 
because it creates an index not a measurable value, but it does have good potential for 
evaluating individual systems.  It gives the system administrator a good rubric for 
determining which nodes or devices need additional support. 
 
2.7.4  Attack Trees 
Ten, et al use attack trees to analyze the impact of a system penetration [89]. An 
attack tree is similar to an attack graph, but that combines multiple attack “leaves” [90].  
Each leaf represents a specific vulnerability, and can be combined with AND or OR.  
The authors calculated vulnerability indices, as proposed by Srivastagva, et al. [88] for 
two leaves: port auditing and password strength, used the results to evaluate security 
improvements, and then presented a case study that modeled various intrusion 
scenarios.  They then compared the results of those various scenarios. 
In the attack tree, G1 through G43 represent the various vulnerabilities to be 
exploited.  Various countermeasures were applied to each vulnerability, leading to an 
improvement in Vulnerability Index.  Figure 2.19 shows the attack tree used, and Figure 
2.20 shows the results. 
 
2.7.5  Weakest Link 
The weakest link approach has been used extensively in literature.  It basically 
views the security of the system as the security of the weakest link [36] [91] [92] [93] 
[94] [95] [96].  While heavily explored, this is a more aggregate approach that relies on 






Figure 2.19 Attack tree [89] 
  
 
Figure 2.20 Leaf Vulnerability Index [89] 
 
2.8  Combination approach 
 Abraham and Nair combine the Probabilistic Approach with attack graphs (an 
Adversary-based metric) and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), an 






Figure 2.21 Combination Approach Analytical Model [97] 
 
 The created a network with four targets nodes, each with vulnerabilities assigned 
from [49], and then overlaid an attack graph with the goal of exploiting node M4.  This is 
described in Figures 2.22 and 2.23. 
 
Figure 2.22 Combination Approach Network [97] 
 
 The authors then calculated a variety of attack graph metrics (as described 
previously). 
Zhang, et al. use CVSS, TTC and attack graphs applied to SCADA systems [98]. 














 Holm, et al conduct a statistical analysis of CVSS data to determine the TTC of 
various attacks [99].  The main contribution of this approach is the fact that it was 
applied to a real-world exercise, Baltic Cyber Shield.  The importance of this cannot be 
understated, as it is possibly the only real-world effort to apply quantification methods to 
analyze cyber-attacks. 
The authors used CVSS to rate the relative security of each node, and measured 
the real-world TTC experienced during the exercise.  The results are interesting. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the CVSS of the weakest link nodes in each system 
would be negatively correlated with TTC.  The results are shown in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8 Correlation Between Weakest Link, CVSS, and TTC [99] 
Scenario Correlation p (two-tailed) 
1 0.036 0.838 
2 0.166 0.349 
3 -0.020 0.913 
4 -0.176 0.320 
5 -0.168 0.342 
6 -0.178 0.312 
 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the vulnerability exposure (as measured in days) would 
be negatively correlated with TTC.  It found a correlation of -0.284 with a two-tailed p of 
0.104. 
 Hypothesis 3 stated that the number of vulnerabilities present in a system, 
characterized by CVSS, would be negatively correlated with TTC.  The results are 
shown in Table 2.9. 
 Hypothesis 4 stated that VEA-bility would be positively correlated with TTC.  The 
authors found a correlation of 0.104 with a two-tailed p of 0.557. 
 Hypothesis 5 stated that the level of security estimated using CVSS as applied 
by Lai and Hsia would be negatively correlated with TTC [80].  The correlation was -




Table 2.9 Correlation Between TTC and Number of Vulnerabilities [99] 
Metric Correlation p (two-tailed) 
High Vulnerabilities -0.269 0.124 
Medium Vulnerabilities -0.240 0.172 
Low Vulnerabilities -0.061 0.733 
All Vulnerabilities -0.199 0.260 
High Vulnerabilities with exploits -0.279 0.110 
Medium Vulnerabilities with exploits -0.240 0.171 
Low Vulnerabilities with exploits -0.117 0.509 
All Vulnerabilities with exploits -0.264 0.132 
 
 Hypotheses 6 stated that McQueen’s method of calculating TTC would positively 
correlate with the real-world TTC [27]. The measured correlation was 0.242 with a two-
tailed p = 0.167. 
 As stated, the results are interesting.  No single correlation was significant at a 
significance level of p < 0.05.  All six hypotheses were rejected.  In other words: in the 
only published results of a real-world exercise where of a range of quantification 
methods for cybersecurity was used to predict TTC, no quantification method correlated 
with TTC with statistical significance.  Clearly, there is room for more work on the topic. 
 
2.9  Conclusion 
 The process of validating a quantification methodology requires a proposed idea, 
presenting the idea analytically, testing the idea with simulations, evaluating the idea 
experimentally or in real-world exercises, and gaining industry acceptance for the 
methodology.  As discussed above, very few of the proposed methodologies have 
progressed beyond the analytical step.  It is necessary, therefore, to take the best 
components of the various ideas, combine them into a new methodology, and go 







6 CHAPTER 3 PROPOSED MODEL 
 
 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, no consensus exists on how to quantify 
cybersecurity.  Existing methods lack robustness, fail to correlate with statistical 
significance in real-world scenarios, and lack general acceptance within the industry 
[21] [41] [99]. 
 
3.1  Contextual Framework 
 The approach presented here uses the best of the many approaches presented 
in Chapter 2, and combines them in a unique way.  The objective is model that 
addresses the various failings of existing efforts in a way that is useful, reflects reality, 
has flexible applications, is secure in that its application does not give unnecessary 
information to adversaries, and is able to compare the levels of security of different 
systems. 
 Consider that a system has only two states: secured and compromised.  If 
secured is the normal state, then certain criteria given below must be met in order to 
transition to the compromised state: 
 The system must possess a vulnerability.   
 The adversary must have a vector to conduct the attack. 
 The adversary must possess the capability of exploiting that vulnerability. 
If we consider vulnerabilities to be discrete items in a set, then we can consider a 
system to be compromised when: 
 
  ∩  ∩  ≠ ∅  (3.1) 
 
 where T is the set of vulnerabilities present in a system, X is the set of 
vulnerabilities with and attack vector, and A is the set of vulnerabilities that an attacker 
is capable of exploiting.  Written more simply, a system is compromised when all the 




3.2  Sets of Vulnerabilities 
 A more thorough analysis of this framework requires consideration of the full 
range of possible vulnerabilities.  Consider V, the set of all possible vulnerabilities in any 
system.  The size of set V is V. 
 V includes all vulnerabilities, even those not yet discovered or known to anybody.  









Figure 3.2 Set of All Known Vulnerabilities 
 
 A subset T of V includes all of the vulnerabilities present in a target system, and 








Figure 3.3 Set of All Vulnerabilities Present in a Target System 
 
 A subset X of T consists of all vulnerabilities in T where there is an attack vector, 






Figure 3.4 Set of Target Vulnerabilities with an Attack Vector 
 
 A subset A of K consists of all vulnerabilities that a given adversary is capable of 
exploiting, and is of size A, as shown in Figure 3.5. 
 P, the intersection of A and X, is the set of vulnerabilities present in a target 
system, where the adversary has an attack vector and the capability to exploit.  It is of 

















Figure 3.6 Set of Vulnerabilities Present, Exploitable, With an Attack Vector 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Vulnerability Sets 
Set Name Set Size Description of Vulnerabilities in Set Notes 
V V All in existence   
K K All known K ⊆ V 
T T All present in a target system T ⊆ V 
X X All with an attack vector X ⊆ T 
A A All that an adversary can exploit A ⊆ K 
P P All in a system, with an attack vector, 
that an adversary can exploit 




3.3  Cyber Potential 
 Based on the model in the previous section, the key attribute of a system that 
determines its level of vulnerability is P, the set of vulnerabilities present in the system, 
with an attack vector, and that an adversary is capable of exploiting.  The size of this 
set, P, is the system’s Cyber Potential.  It effectively represents the opportunity to 
conduct an attack through a particular vector.  A large value for P reflects a vector with 
more exploitable vulnerabilities. 
 Consider a simple scenario of a single target system, a single adversary, and a 
single attack vector, as shown in Figure 3.7.  The adversary is capable of exploiting a 
set of vulnerabilities A.  The target system has a set of vulnerabilities, T, of which some 
subset, X, the adversary can exploit through an attack vector.  The cyber potential, P, is 






Figure 3.7 Simple Scenario 
 
3.4  Cyber Resistance 
 Conceptually, cyber resistance is the amount of time necessary to conduct an 
effective attack.  Consider P, a set of vulnerabilities that an adversary can exploit 
through a vector.  Each vulnerability in P can be characterized by the amount of time 
necessary to successfully exploit it, t.  Recall that P is a subset of K. Realistically, t for 
each vulnerability in K could and should be determined in a laboratory given 
standardized conditions, equipment, and procedures. This will be discussed in Chapter 
5. 




 For reasons that will be clear later in the chapter, R is simply the average value 
of t for all the vulnerabilities in K on that attack vector. 
 
 = =  ∑�  (3.2) 
 
 The unit of cyber resistance is seconds. 
 
3.5  Attack Rate 
 Attack rate, I, reflects the level of security of a specific attack vector.  
Conceptually, it can be viewed as: 
 
 � =  � �� �    ℎ   (3.3) 
 
 Continuing the model presented thus far, if PR is the number of vulnerabilities in 
P through a specific vector, then: 
 
 � =  � =   �  (3.4) 
 














3.6  Cyber Power 
 While attack rate reflects the level of security through a specific attack vector, 
cyber power reflects the overall level of security for the system.  Consider the system in 
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Figure 3.9 System with Multiple Attack Vectors 
 
 Clearly, any measure of overall security must consider all of the attack vectors, 
as well as the overall vulnerability of the system.  The simplest way of combining these 
values is: 
 
 = ∗ ∑ � (3.5) 
 
where W is the cyber power, and T is the total number of vulnerabilities present in a 
system.  The unit of cyber power is attacks2 per second 
 
3.7  Simplified Model 
 The worst case scenario assumes that an attacker has an attack vector and the 





 � =  =  =     (3.6) 
 
 In this situation, a system engineer needs to only know the vulnerabilities present 
in a system and the number of attack vectors, n.  This information is available through 
standard penetration testing [100].  Simplifying everything yields: 
 
 =   (3.7) 
 
 The concepts described above are summarized in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Security Model Concepts 
Concept Description Unit Symbol Mathematical 
Definition 
Cyber Potential System vulnerability Attacks P � =   ∩  
Cyber 
Resistance 
Difficulty to attack 
through a vector 
Second R = =  ∑�  
Attack Rate System vulnerability 
/ Difficulty to attack 
Attacks / 
Second 
I � =  � = � 
Cyber Power Quantified security Attacks2 / 
second 
W = ∗ ∑ � 
 
3.8  Simple Example 
 Consider a very simple scenario, where vulnerabilities are represented by 
integers. There is a single target system with four adversaries conducting attacks, as in 
Figure 3.9.  Table 3.3 describes the situation. 
 Additionally, consider that = , = , = , and = .  
 Through vector 1, P1 = 1 attack.  The attack rate is � =  � =   = . . 




the attack rate is � =  � =   = . Through vector 4, the attack rate is � =  � =  = . .   
 The overall level of security for the target system, Cyber Power, is = ∗ ∑ � = ∗ . + . + . = .  . 
 
3.9  Measures of Security 
Cyber power is proposed as a method of quantifying security, that is, to define a 
value that can be used to accurately compare the relative security of various systems, 
can be used to make security decisions, must reflect reality, must be flexible enough to 
apply to a variety of vulnerabilities, must not reveal information about the system that 
can be used to penetrate it, and must apply to a variety of systems and situations.  It is 
primarily a reflective value on a secure system.   
Two values can be used to measure the security of a system in a laboratory 
environment or in a simulation.  The first is Success Rate, , which is the probability 
that an adversary is able to conduct a successful attack. The second is Difficulty, , 
which reflects the average amount of time consumed by an adversary while conducting 
an attack.    
A given vulnerability can be characterized by three values: the probability that an 
attacker can exploit it, , the probability that it exists in a system, , and the difficulty 
of exploiting the vulnerability, t, for any vulnerability . 
These values can and should be determined in a laboratory using a standard 
attacker under standard conditions.  For continuity and accuracy, a single entity should 
establish a pool of known vulnerabilities (K essentially) and determine the appropriate 
characteristics for each vulnerability.  This has a precedent in other types of security, 
namely Underwriter Laboratories method of rating and evaluating safes [44]. Such an 
effort requires resources beyond that currently available; however, a possible 
methodology will be discussed in Chapter 5. 





Table 3.3 Example Sets 
Set Name Set Size Vulnerabilities in Set Notes 
V V = 9 =  { , , , , , , , , }  
K K = 8 =  { , , , , , , , } K ⊆ V 
T T = 6 =  { , , , , , } T ⊆ V 
X1 X1 = 2 =  { , } X ⊆ T 
X2 X2 = 3 =  { , , } X ⊆ T 
X3 X3 = 1 =  { } X ⊆ T 
X4 X4 = 2 =  { , } X ⊆ T 
A1 A1 = 1 =  { } A ⊆ K 
A2 A2 = 1 =  { } A ⊆ K 
A3 A3 = 2 =  { , } A ⊆ K 
A4 A4 = 4 =  { , , , } A ⊆ K 
P1 P1 = 1 � =  { } � =   ∩  
P2 P2 = 1 � =  { } � =   ∩  
P3 P3 = 0 � =  ∅ � =   ∩  
P4 P4 = 2 � =  { , } � =   ∩  
  
Table 3.4 Vulnerability Characteristics 
Characteristic Description 
 For vulnerability , the probability that ∈  . 
 For vulnerability , the probability that ∈  . 
 Amount of time necessary for an adversary to exploit vulnerability  
 
Recall that  
 




 To determine the cyber power without further knowledge of the adversary, we 
therefore need only consider the elements in X.  Recall that for each element in X, ,  
 is the probability that ∈  .  Since the element is in X, it is also the probability that ∈  �.   
The success rate is simply the probability that A includes at least one element in 
P.  Using simple math, 
   
 = − ∏ −�   (3.9) 
 
 The expected cyber potential, �, can be predicted analytically.  As with rs,, 
consider only the elements in X, as other vulnerabilities that may be in V are not of 
interest when determining �.   
 The expected value of P, then, Is the probability that A includes at least one 
element in P multiplied by the size of X. 
 
 � =  ∗   (3.10) 
 
 The predicted cyber power can then be calculated as: 
 
 =  ∗ ∑ � = ∗ ∑  �  =  ∗ ∑ ∗    (3.11) 
 
 Note that, for the special case of a single attack vector: 
 
 = ∗ ∗    (3.12) 
 





  ∝    (3.13) 
 
 Since  and  are the measures of security, it holds that W will reflect them. 
 Predicting the average time required,  , is not deterministic without knowing A.  
Knowledge of A is required to include the unknown elements of A through which and 
adversary would need to iterate while attacking.  Without more information,  when � = ∅ would be 0.  When a successful attack occurs,  will not include the failed attempts 
that preceded the successful attack.   
A simple approach is to assign a large number to   ,  , when � =  ∅ to reflect 
the time wasted, and to add some average amount of expended time to the expected , 
,during a successful attack.   
In that case, an estimate for the approximate, expected amount of time 
necessary to conduct an attack is: 
 
 ′ = − + ∑  +    (3.14) 
 
These values are summarized in Table 3.5. 
 
3.10  Practical example 
 Consider the marketing operations center at a utility with the following network, 
as shown in Figure 3.10 
During a security audit, the security manager discovers a number of attack 
vectors and vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 3.6. 







Table 3.5 Measures of Security 
Concept Description Unit Symbol Mathematical Definition 
Success rate Probability of 
successful attack 





Attacks � � =  ∗  








of time necessary 
to conduct an 
attack 





amount of time 
necessary to 
conduct an attack 
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Figure 3.10 Example network 
 
Table 3.6 Example vulnerabilities 
Vector Vulnerability Type �� �� � 
Web 1 File server  Technical 0.0001 0.5 1 year 
Database server  Technical 0.001 0.5 1 month 
Workstation Technical 0.001 0.1 1 month 
Weak password Administrative 0.01 0.1 1 day 
Workstations 2 Missing keys Physical 0.01 0.5 1 day 
Unsecured USB ports Physical 0.1 0.5 1 hour 
Server room 3 Single-person access Administrative 0.01 0.1 1 hour 
Employees 4 Corruption Administrative 0.0001 0.01 1 year 
No vector Offline database Technical 0.01 0.5 1 month 




From that information, it is clear that T = 10.  For the four vectors, X1 = 4, X2 = 2, 
X3 = 1, X4 = 1. Cyber resistance along each vector is the average amount of time 








 � =  ∗   (3.10) 
 
Therefore, � =  .  , � =  .  , � =  .  , and � = .  . 
Recalling that 
 
 � =  � =   �  (3.4) 
 
yields � = . ∗  −  / , � = . ∗  −  / , � = . ∗  −  / , and � =. ∗  −  / . 
 with 
 
 = ∗ ∑ � (3.5) 
 
the cyber power for the system, = . ∗  −  /  
Chapter 4 will implement this model and expand on the concepts presented in 




7 CHAPTER 4 MODELING, SIMULATION, AND RESULTS 
 The core hypothesis of this dissertation is that the methodology presented in 
Chapter 3 accurately quantifies cybersecurity in a manner that is useful, reflects reality, 
has flexible applications, is secure in that its application does not give unnecessary 
information to adversaries, and is able to compare the levels of security of different 
systems. 
 
4.1  Evaluation Criteria 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, there is a no consensus as to a methodology for 
quantifying cybersecurity.  As shown in Chapter 2, some criteria have been proposed; 
however, there is no indication that they have been widely adopted.  For that reason, 
part of the process of developing the methodology presented in Chapter 3 requires the 
concurrent development of the criteria for evaluating its efficacy. 
 
Table 4.1 Evaluation criteria 
Criterion Description 
Accuracy Any methodology that purports to quantify cybersecurity must, in 
fact, quantify cybersecurity. 
Utility Users of the methodology must be able to use it to make decisions 
that impact security. 
Reality The quantified values must be observable and measurable, not 
merely theoretical abstractions. 
Flexibility The methodology must be model a wide range of technical, 
administrative, and physical vulnerabilities. 
Security Quantifying a system must not reveal information that aids an 
adversary in conducting an attack. 
Portability The methodology must be able to compare the relative levels of 





 The concept of security requires some further elaboration.  There is an inherent 
contradiction in the requirement to quantify a system’s level of security and the 
necessity to limit information available to an adversary.  At a minimum, publishing a 
value that meets the other criteria will tell an adversary which systems are most 
susceptible to exploitation.  For the sake of this analysis, a methodology that meets the 
security criterion will only reveal that minimum amount of information.  It will not give 
any information to an adversary that will allow it to optimize its attacks. 
 
4.2  Testing Methodology 
 Each evaluation criterion requires its own testing methodology as described 
below. All software was written using Python 3.4.  Python is an object-oriented 
programming language that is available for free.  Vulnerabilities can be characterized 
easily using objects, making this a suitable choice in programming languages.  The 
Python code was generally used to output to a .csv (comma separated value) file, that 
could be manipulated in Excel for data analysis and presentation. 
 
4.2.1  Accuracy 
 Hypothesis 1: Cyber Power will actively predict security; that is, it will correlate 
with attacker success rate and correlate negatively with difficulty. 
 Evaluation of the model’s accuracy is conducted in 5 steps.   
Step 1: Model attacks in software. 
 The first step is to develop software to model an attack.  Recall from section 3.1 
that a successful attack occurs when: 
 The system possesses a vulnerability.   
 The adversary has a vector to conduct the attack. 
 The adversary possesses the capability of exploiting that vulnerability. 
 The adversary is actively conducting an attack. 
In order to model this situation, consider a simple case where an adversary is 




attack a single vulnerability present in the target system. For this step, assume that T = 
X, since it is only considering a single attacker, a single target, and a single vector. 
Consider A to be the integers in the range 1…A, and X to be a single, randomly 
determined, integer in A. The attack process consists of iterating through A until � , 
where  is the element of A under consideration.  The important value here is the 
number of iterations necessary to reach that condition. 
The code to conduct this test is found in Appendix B, Section 1.  The code outputs 
to a file that can be used to display the data in another program. 
The simulation was run 100 times each for A in the range 2…100. Using simple 





Figure 4.1 Step 1 Attack Scenario 
 
 As is evident from Figure 4.2, the expected number of iterations before a 
successful attack matches closely with the prediction.   
Step 2: Create set of attacker capabilities  
 Step 1 demonstrated a very simple method for  conducting an attack in a very 
simple scenario.  Step 2 yields a more realistic representation of V and A with the 
potential for multiple vulnerabilities with attack vectors to be present in T.  For this step, 
assume that T = X, since it is only considering a simple scenario of a single attacker, a 





















 In this case, A is a randomly generated set of integers in the range 1…V.  X is 
also a random integer in the range 1…V.  X is the set of integers in the range 1…X.  
The attack is conducted when the adversary iterates through A until � .  
 This scenario has three possible outcomes, described in Table 4.2. 
   




� =  ∩  =  ∅ No No successful attack can occur |�| = |  ∩ | =  Yes A successful attack occurs when � . |�| = |  ∩  | >  Yes A successful attack occurs in the first instance 
when � . 
 
 In this case, there are two interesting values; whether an attack is successful and 
the number of iterations necessary to conduct the attack, both in relation to the cyber 
power and simplified Cyber Power.  In both cases, it was assumed for simplification that  = . 
The code to conduct this test is found in Appendix B, Section 2.   
The simulation was run 40 times each for V in the range 1…40 and, for each 
value of V, X in the range 1…V and A in the range 1…V.  Larger sample sizes required 
excessive time to compile.  Figure 4.4 shows the cyber power vs. success rate. 
Note that, above a certain value for cyber power, the success rate is 100%.  
Figure 4.5 is the same data, but only for values of cyber power under 100. 
 These graphs shows several interesting details.   
1. As previously noted, for any value of cyber power over a certain value, the 
success rate is 100%.  Effectively, any adversary can penetrate the system.   
2. Even at very low levels of cyber power, some adversaries will successfully 
penetrate the system.  These correspond to extremely capable adversaries.  In 
the case of this simulation, a low number such as 1 or 2 is found in A, even 




3. There is a distinctive logarithmic curvature to the scatter plot.  Below a certain 



















 Figure 4.6 shows the cyber power vs. difficulty, as measured in attempts. 
 
Figure 4.6 Test 2 Cyber Power vs. Attempts 
 
A few observations: 
1. As with cyber power vs. success rate, there is a distinctive logarithmic curve to 




2. Also above a certain value of cyber power, the number of attempts becomes 
quite low.  Compared to success rate, however, the drop off is relatively gradual.  
This gradual degradation is due to the fact that, when A is large and X is not as 
large, the adversary must cycle through attacks that are not successful before 
conducting a successful attack. 
Step 3: Add a set of target vulnerabilities 
 Step 2 created a set of attacker capabilities, A, but the set of target vulnerabilities 
with a vector, X, was simplified.  Step 3 creates X in a similar manner to the method 
used in Step 2 to create A.  X in Step 3 is a randomly generated set of integers in the 
range 1…V.  The only difference between this step and step 2 is the method of 
generating X.  For this step, assume that T = X, since it is only considering a simple 














Figure 4.7 Step 3 Attack Scenario 
 
The code to conduct this test is found in Appendix B, Section 3.  The code outputs 




The simulation was run 40 times each for V in the range 1…40 and, for each 
value of V, X in the range 1…V and A in the range 1…V.  The following figures show the 
results, which are quite similar to those found in step 2. 
 





Figure 4.9 Test 3 Cyber Power vs. Attempts 
 
Step 4: Describe the vulnerabilities 
Step 3 created the shell of a realistic scenario, wherein there is a global pool of 
vulnerabilities, V, a subset of which are present in a target, T, a further subset of which 




subset of V.  Step 4 refines this model by actually describing each vulnerability, Vn, 
using three characteristics:  
 
Table 4.3 Vulnerability Characteristics 
Characteristic Description 
Attacker probability, pA,n Probability that �  
Target probability, pT,n Probability that �  
Difficulty, tn The amount of time some standard attacker would require 
to exploit the vulnerability under some standard conditions. 
 
For this step, assume that T = X, since it is only considering a simple scenario of 
a single attacker, a single target, and a single attack vector. 
The attack scenario in Step 4 is nearly identical to that in step 3.  The primary 
difference is that, instead of V being a set of integers, it is a set of objects.  Generating 
A and X requires that pA and pT be considered.  Conceptually, the elements of A are 
more likely to have high values of pA.  The same relationship exists between X and pT.   
This scenario has two values of interest: whether a successful attack occurs, and 
the amount of time necessary to conduct the successful attack.  If an adversary iterates 
through A n times before conducting a successful attack, then the amount of time, t, 
necessary to conduct a successful attack is: 
 
 = ∑ ��=   (4.1) 
  
where ti is the amount of time necessary to conduct each iteration. 
The code to conduct this test is found in Appendix B, Section 4.  The code outputs 
to a file that can be used to display the data in another program. 
The simulation was run 40 times each for V in the range 1…40 and, for each 





Test 4 shows the same pattern as tests 2 and 3, save that the logarithmic curve is 
less distinct on the success rate graph.  This is due to the added consideration of attack 
difficulty.  A few tests have A containing attacks with very low values of , ,and .  
That yields low values for success rate, but relatively average values for cyber power.  
This corresponds to an adversary having access only to vulnerabilities that occur rarely 
in target systems, most other adversaries do not have, and are relatively easy to use.  
An example in the physical world would be a copy of a key.  It is improbable that it will 
work against any random lock, improbable that an adversary would have that particular 
key, but relatively easy to use in the odd chance that it matches the target lock. 
 
 





Figure 4.11 Test 4 Cyber Power vs. Time 
   
Step 5: Determine correlation between cyber power, success rate, and difficulty. 
 This step considered a situation where K consists of 27 possible vulnerabilities, 
and ten systems have some subset of those vulnerabilities.  For simplicity, it is assumed 
that all of these vulnerabilities lie along a single attack vector; therefore, T = K.  Table 











Vulnerability 1 0.001 0.1 100 
Vulnerability 2 0.001 0.1 500 
Vulnerability 3 0.001 0.1 1000 
Vulnerability 4 0.001 0.3 100 
Vulnerability 5 0.001 0.3 500 
Vulnerability 6 0.001 0.3 1000 
Vulnerability 7 0.001 0.5 100 
Vulnerability 8 0.001 0.5 500 
Vulnerability 9 0.001 0.5 1000 
Vulnerability 10 0.01 0.1 100 
Vulnerability 11 0.01 0.1 500 
Vulnerability 12 0.01 0.1 1000 
Vulnerability 13 0.01 0.3 100 
Vulnerability 14 0.01 0.3 500 
Vulnerability 15 0.01 0.3 1000 
Vulnerability 16 0.01 0.5 100 
Vulnerability 17 0.01 0.5 500 
Vulnerability 18 0.01 0.5 1000 
Vulnerability 19 0.1 0.1 100 
Vulnerability 20 0.1 0.1 500 
Vulnerability 21 0.1 0.1 1000 
Vulnerability 22 0.1 0.3 100 
Vulnerability 23 0.1 0.3 500 
Vulnerability 24 0.1 0.3 1000 
Vulnerability 25 0.1 0.5 100 
Vulnerability 26 0.1 0.5 500 




This data set includes vulnerabilities with relatively high, medium, and low values 
for each of the three vulnerability characteristics. 
 The simulation was run with ten test scenarios.  The first is a base case where all 
27 vulnerabilities are present.  The remainder eliminate vulnerabilities with some 
characteristic.   
 Success rate, cyber power, and estimated difficulty were calculated using the 
method in Chapter 3.  Recall that: 
 
 = − ∏ −�   (3.9) 
 




 ′ = − + ∑  +    (3.14) 
 
 In this case, is set to 1000 and  is set to 10,000.  These values are arbitrary.   The 
predicted values, scenario descriptions and calculated values are shown in Table 4.5. 
 These scenarios were run 500 times, using code modified from 4.3.1 Test 4.   
The code to conduct this test is found in Appendix B, Section 5.  The results are 
displayed Table 4.6 and Figures 4.12 through 4.14. 
.   Observationally, the data show that calculated and simulated values were 
generally close and cyber power correlates positively with success rate and negatively 
with difficulty.  To prove Hypothesis 1, the correlations were calculated and a two-tailed 
t-test was run to determine significance.   The results are shown in Table 4.7. Clearly, 
since p << 0.05 for all values and the correlations are all strong, the cyber power 

















Base None None 0.65 0.0329 5032 
1 High t 3,6,9,12,15,18,21,24,27 0.50 0.0300 5866 
2 Medium t 2,5,8,11,14,17,20,23,26 0.50 0.0164 6032 
3 Low t 1,4,7,10,13,16,19,22,25 0.50 0.0120 6165 
4 High (pT) 7,8,9,16,17,18,25,26,27 0.50 0.0169 6021 
5 Medium (pT) 4,5,6,13,14,15,22,23,24 0.50 0.0169 6021 
6 Low (pT) 1,2,3,10,11,12,19,20,21 0.50 0.0169 6021 
7 High (pA) 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,2
6,27 
0.095 0.0032 9202 
8 Medium (pA) 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,1
7,18 
0.62 0.0209 5194 


































  Mean σ    Mean σ 
Base 0.0329 0.0336 0.0240 0.65 0.664 5032 4379 4310 
1 0.0300 0.0262 0.0298 0.50 0.436 5866 6203 4326 
2 0.0164 0.0149 0.0163 0.50 0.456 6032 6147 4224 
3 0.0120 0.0105 0.0119 0.50 0.436 6166 6408 4094 
4 0.0169 0.0146 0.0168 0.50 0.432 6021 6356 4191 
5 0.0169 0.0152 0.0167 0.50 0.450 6021 6185 4229 
6 0.0169 0.0151 0.0168 0.50 0.446 6021 6216 4230 
7 0.0032 0.0020 0.0079 0.095 0.058 9202 9507 1991 
8 0.0209 0.0205 0.0165 0.62 0.606 5194 4871 4147 






Figure 4.12 Test 5 Cyber Power 
 
 






Figure 4.14 Test 5 Difficulty 
  
Table 4.7 Correlations 
Cyber Power 
Method 
Evaluation Criteria Correlation (r) Significance  





0.763 . ∗ −  
Simulated Success 
Rate 
0.769 . ∗ −  
Calculated Difficulty -0.784 . ∗ −  





0.792 . ∗ −  
Simulated Success 
Rate 
0.817 . ∗ −  
Calculated Difficulty -0.801 . ∗ −  




4.2.2  Utility 
 As stated previously, users of this quantification methodology must be able to 
use it to make decisions that impact the security of the system. As security managers 
do not have infinite budgets, it is impractical to eliminate every potential vulnerability.  A 
quantification method can be used to which vulnerabilities should be mitigated to 
maximize system security. 
 Reconsider Step 5 of 4.3.1. The situation presented offers an opportunity to 
demonstrate this. Suppose a security manager has the situation as described in the 
base scenario, that is, 27 vulnerabilities on a single attack vector with a variety of 
characteristics.  The security manager should eliminate vulnerabilities based on the 
change in W, ∆ .  Table 4.5 shows that scenario 7 has the greatest impact on W, and 
therefore should have the greatest impact on  and .   
 Scenario 7 has the greatest decrease in cyber power, the greatest decrease in 
success rate, and the greatest increase in difficulty.  If the security manager implements 
scenario 7 based on calculated cyber power, it will have the greatest impact on the 
measures of security: success rate and difficulty.  This demonstrates a simple example 
of the utility of this model.   
 
 4.2.3  Reality 
 Recall that 
 
 =  ∗ ∑ � = ∗ ∑  �  =  ∗ ∑ ∗    (3.11) 
    
 Cyber power is, therefore, a function of four components: T, the number of 
vulnerabilities in a system; X, the number of vulnerabilities in a system with an attack 
vector, , the probability of a successful attack, and , the mean difficulty of conducting 
an attack.  Additionally,  and  are the designated measures of security. 
 Proving that cyber power matches reality requires proof that those four 




methodology of evaluating a system and counting the results.  Fortunately, an entire 
industry exists to do this through penetration testing, and NIST and others have 
published standards to oguide execution [101] [102] [103].  Among the outcomes of 
these tests are a list of vulnerabilities and attack vectors [100]. Therefore, T and X can 
be obtained through established testing methodologies, and can be said to reflect 
reality. 
 Proving that , and  reflect reality is a greater challenge, and requires laboratory 
testing methodologies that have not been well established.  The quantification 
methodologies MTTC and TTC propose these methodologies; however, they have not 
been well established or independently verified [25] [45].   









Figure 4.15 High-level Representation of Proposed Test Bed 
 
 The test bed has three main components: the system under test, a collection of 
technical, physical, and administrative attack vectors, and a collection of standard 
adversaries.  These adversaries should be structured to represent increasingly capable 




%), expert ( = . %), and elite ( = . %) levels of skills and resources.  Anything 
beyond that would be prohibitively expensive for practical testing.  Tests can be run 
wherein a system under test has a specific vulnerability, the standard adversaries 
iterate through their tools and the vector toolbox, and a measurement is taken for the 
amount of time required to conduct the test.  Given enough iterations, the average time 
can then be reported as  an the skill level of the lowest-skill successful adversary can 
be reported as .  
 Recall that  
 
 = − ∏ −�   (3.9) 
 
 Finding  depends only on X and , which are determined in a laboratory 
setting and can therefore be considered to reflect reality. 
 In sum, proving that cyber power reflects reality requires laboratory verification, 
which requires resources not available at this time. 
 
4.2.4  Flexibility 
 A flexible quantification scheme is one that can apply to a variety of technical, 
administrative, and a physical vulnerabilities.  The criteria used to evaluate 
vulnerabilities ( , ,and ) were deliberately chosen to be measurable in a laboratory.  
Consider three vulnerabilities: a password of a given length (administrative), a locked 
door (physical), and unpatched software (technical).  Some percentage of adversaries 
will be able to crack the password, open the door, or exploit the code in the software.  
Some percentage of target systems will have those vulnerabilities.  Exploiting each 
vulnerability will require some amount of time.   
The methodology described in 4.3.2 is applicable regardless of the nature of the 
vulnerability.  Adversaries with increasing levels of capability can be established in each 
domain: physical, technical, administrative.  Sample vectors can be established for 




As with Reality, demonstrating flexibility requires laboratory experimentation; 
unfortunately, the resources are not currently available. 
 
4.2.5  Security 
 To prove security, it is necessary to prove that stating a system’s cyber power 
will not reveal details that an adversary can use to ease exploitation.  Obviously, simply 
stating cyber power will advertise which nodes or systems are more or less secure; 
however, the information cannot be used for an adversary to identify specific 
vulnerabilities or vectors. 
 Recall that  
 
 =  ∗ ∑ � = ∗ ∑  �  =  ∗ ∑ ∗    (3.11) 
    
 Demonstrating security requires that demonstrating that W can have the same 
value for various values of T, X, , and , as well as the number of attack vectors, n. 
Consider the following ten scenarios, using simplified values for each component. 
 
Table 4.8 Security Demonstration 
Scenario T n X   W 
1 2 1 2 10 0.5 0.2 







3 4 1 3 24 0.4 0.2 























 Note that the cyber power is the same in all 5 scenarios; however, no two values 
for success rate, difficulty, or number of vulnerabilities in the system are the same.  A 
large value for cyber power can result from a large number of vulnerabilities, 
vulnerabilities that many adversaries can exploit, vulnerabilities that require little effort to 
exploit, or some combination.  Reporting cyber power does not reveal any other 
information. 
 
4.2.6  Portability 
 Demonstrating portability requires demonstrating that, for any two systems, the 
system with the lower value of cyber power is more secure.  The challenge is the 
unpredictable nature of adversaries.  An extremely secure system could be attacked by 
an extremely capable adversary, whereas an effectively unsecured system may never 
be attacked.  The important values to compare relative security are the average 
success rate and the average time.   
 Proving portability requires demonstrating that the average success rate, , and 
the average difficulty,  , meet the following criteria for all values of W: 
 




   �  <    (4.3) 
 
 Consider the data in Test 4 above, and smooth the results using a 50 sample 










Figure 4.17 Portability Cyber Power vs. Time 
  
 This methodology would meet these criteria if the graphs had no local maxima or 
minima.  Clearly, that standard is not met.   Using a large moving average and a larger 
data set would likely eliminate the local minima and maxima; however, it would have the 
net result of camouflaging the data to reflect an untrue state.   
 The limited portability is likely a problem inherent to any methodology that relies 
on probabilities. Additionally, the introduction of T and X into the equation potentially 
impacts the portability. As shown in 4.3.1, however, W does correlate strongly with , 




systems.  It cannot be said, however, with 100% certainty, that a system with a higher 






9 CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Chapter 4 demonstrated the analytical validity of the model and supported that 
with simulations.  Experimental and empirical evaluation are necessary before industry 
acceptance can be pursued. 
 
5.1  Results 
 Recall from Chapter 4 that the following criteria were used to evaluate the 
quantification methodology. 
 
Table 5.1 Evaluation criteria 
Criterion Description 
Accuracy Any methodology that purports to quantify cybersecurity must, in 
fact, quantify cybersecurity. 
Utility Users of the methodology must be able to use it to make decisions 
that impact security. 
Reality The quantified values must be observable and measurable, not 
merely theoretical abstractions. 
Flexibility The methodology must be model a wide range of technical, 
administrative, and physical vulnerabilities. 
Security Quantifying a system must not reveal information that aids an 
adversary in conducting an attack. 
Portability The methodology must be able to compare the relative levels of 
security of different systems. 
 
 Chapter 4 demonstrated that this methodology clearly meets the criteria for 




laboratory facilities that are not currently available.  The methodology does not meet a 
high standard for portability, but a correlation does exist. 
 The initial results are promising, especially in comparison to previously published 
efforts as described in Chapter 2.  Further work is necessary to validate Reality and 
Flexibility, to establish a set of vulnerabilities evaluated by , ,and . 
 This dissertation has had two major impacts on the current state of research into 
cybersecurity quantification.  The first is that it presents a new approach that takes the 
best features of existing methodologies, and combines them in a way that is useful and 
mathematically correct.  The second is that it presents techniques for modeling cyber 
attacks mathematically using simple software that can be used to evaluate this and 
other approaches.  Less significantly, this document aggregates the results of dozens of 
other attempts to quantify security, addresses in detail the problem of cybersecurity in 
the context of power systems, and presents a path for future research that can have 
impact in academia, the utility sector, the national security sector, industry, and 
government. 
 
5.2  Future work 
 The possible applications of this methodology are great, ranging from utility in 
designing and running systems, to developing standards, to providing topics for 
countless masters’ theses.  In the short term, several steps should be taken. 
 First, Reality and Flexibility must be verified in a laboratory.  To do this, a well-
organized test bed must be developed.  The loose sketch of one is provided in 4.3.3.  
The core capability of this test bed is the ability to determine , ,and  for a wide 
range of vulnerabilities.   
 Recall from Chapter 2 that Byres, et al. propose Mean Time To Compromise 
(MTTC) as a security metric.  While it does not meet all the evaluation criteria 
established in this document, it does propose an approach that can be adapted to assist 
with this model [25] [42] [43].  MTTC is based on the method used by Underwriters 
Laboratories to rate commercial safes [44].  A sample rating that a safe may receive is 




 This rating includes the resources used to penetrate the safe and the amount of 
time that it lasted before it was compromised.  Those values can be easily related to  
and .   will depend on the resources required to exploit the vulnerability, and  relates 
directly.  A laboratory could set up a test bed with 6 levels of capability, corresponding 
to = %, = %, = %, = . %, = . %, and = . %.  
Similarly, the vulnerability can go through tests at each level and a rating can be given 
for how long it lasts under tests.  For simplicity, these values can be grouped and 
named, as in Table 5.1. 
TXTL-60X6





Figure 5.1 Sample safe rating 
 
 Each level will have increased amount of resources, as measured by personnel 
and equipment, designed to correspond roughly to capability of a similar adversary.  
Vulnerabilities can then be tested at each level of capability, and the vulnerability can be 
given a rating that matches the results of the test.  For example, if the vulnerability 
cannot be exploited in any reasonable time in the Class A, B, or C laboratory, but fails in 
2 days in the Class D laboratory, then the vulnerability can be rated a D-3 vulnerability.   
When a network undergoes penetration testing, the vulnerabilities present can be 
identified and rated.  The security manager can then use those ratings to make 
decisions that will secure the network. 
 Another major step is to establish K.  A good starting point is the National 
Vulnerability Database published by NIST and updated daily.  As of 17 April 16, it 
includes a database of 76,067 common vulnerabilities [49].  Unfortunately, it has two 
limitations.  First, it only addresses technical vulnerabilities.  Metrics are needed for 




networks, and does not include vulnerabilities for industrial control and automation 
systems.  Establishing and managing such a database is the stuff of government 
agencies.   
 
Table 5.1 Vulnerability Ratings 
Class Name �� Time Rating  
A 100% 1 1 minute 
B 10% 2 1 hour 
C 1% 3 1 day 
D 0.1% 4 1 week 
E 0.01% 5 1 month 
F 0.001% 6 1 year 
  
  The most critical area of future research is application to real-world exercises.  
To date, only one attempt to apply cybersecurity quantification methods to real-world 
events has been published [99].  As discussed in chapter 2, the results were 
underwhelming. The ability to accurately measure security in a useful manner in an 
operational environment is the holy grail of this research area. 
 The final element of future work to be discussed is the need to establish some 
level of industry acceptance.  This requires soft skills of networking and marketing, but 
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APPENDIX A CYBER SECURITY STANDARDS 
 
 This appendix contains a list of cybersecurity standards for the power grid. 
 
Table A.1 Selected Power Grid Cybersecurity Standards 
Publisher Standard Number Standard Name 
North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
CIP-002-5.1 
Cybersecurity — BES Cyber 
System Categorization 
CIP-003-5 
Cybersecurity - Security 
Management Controls 
CIP-004-5.1 
Cybersecurity — Personnel & 
Training 
CIP-005-5 
Cybersecurity - Electronic 
Security Perimeter(s) 
CIP-006-5 
Cybersecurity - Physical 
Security of BES Cyber 
Systems 
CIP-007-5 
Cybersecurity - System 
Security Management 
CIP-008-5 
Cybersecurity - Incident 
Reporting and Response 
Planning 
CIP-009-5 
Cybersecurity - Recovery 
Plans for BES Cyber Systems 
CIP-010-1 
Cybersecurity - Configuration 
Change Management and 
Vulnerability Assessments 
CIP-011-1 






Table A.2 Selected Power Grid Cybersecurity Standards 
Publisher Standard Number Standard Name 
International Organization 





Information security management 
systems -- Overview and 
vocabulary 
ISO/IEC 27002 
Code of practice for information 
security controls 
ISO/IEC 27003 
Information security management 
system implementation guidance 
ISO/IEC 27004 
Information security management -- 
Measurement 
ISO/IEC 27005 




certification of information security 
management systems 
ISO/IEC 27007 
Guidelines for information security 
management systems auditing 
ISO/IEC 27008 
Guidelines for auditors on 
information security controls 
ISO/IEC 27010 
Information security management 
for inter-sector and inter-
organizational communications 
ISO/IEC 27011 
Information security management 
guidelines for telecommunications 
organizations… 






Table A.3 Selected Power Grid Cybersecurity Standards 





based on ISO/IEC 27002 for 
process control systems 
specific to the energy utility 
industry 
ISO/IEC 27032 Guidelines for cybersecurity 
ISO/IEC 27033 Network security  
ISO/IEC 27035 




Telecontrol equipment and 
systems 
IEC 61850 
Communication networks and 
systems for power utility 
automation 
IEC 62351 
Power systems management 




networks - Network and 
system security 
IEC 62746 
System interfaces and 
communication 
protocol(s)...for systems 






Table A.4 Selected Power Grid Cybersecurity Standards 
Publisher Standard Number Standard Name 
International Society of 
Automation (ISA) 
ISA 99 (AKA 
ANSI/ISA 62443) 
Industrial Automation and 
Control Systems Security 
National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) 
  




Guidelines for Smart Grid 
Cybersecurity 
NIST SP 800 Series Computer Security 
Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
1686-2013 




for Substation Automation, 







APPENDIX B CODE 
This appendix contains the code used in Chapter 4.   
 
Section 1: Step 1 code 
1. from random import randint   
2. from statistics import stdev   
3. from statistics import mean   
4. import csv   
5. # initialize sets   
6. As = []   
7. means = []    
8. output = []   
9. # run 100 iterations at each value A = 2...100   
10. i = 100   
11. a = 2   
12. A = 100   
13. while a <= 100:   
14.     result = []   
15.     As.append(a)   
16.     for k in range(i): #conduct i attacks   
17.         v = randint(1, a)   
18.         n = 1   
19.         while n <= a: # determine when an attack is successful   
20.             if n == v:   
21.                 result.append(n)   
22.                 break   
23.             n += 1   
24.     if len(result) > 1:   
25.         m = mean(result)   




27.     a += 1   
28.        
29. #output to CSV file   
30. b = open('test1.csv', 'w')   
31. x = csv.writer(b)   
32. output = []   
33. data00 = ['A:']   
34. data01 = ['Mean number of attempts:']   
35. for item in As:   
36.     data00.append(item)   
37. for item in means:   
38.     data01.append(item)   
39. output.append(data00)   
40. output.append(data01)   
41. x.writerows(output)   






Section 2: Step 2 code 
1. from random import randint   
2. from statistics import stdev   
3. from statistics import mean   
4. import csv   
5. output = []   
6. i = 40 #iterations   
7. V = 40 #pool of vulnerabilities   
8. k = 0   
9. #clear output file   
10. output = []   
11. #conduct test   
12. data00 = ['Test A']   
13. data01 = ['Test X']   
14.    
15. data03 = ['Simplified Power']   
16. while k < i: #conduct i scenarios   
17.     data02 = ['Power']   
18.     data04 = ['Attempts']   
19.     data05 = ['Success']   
20.     k +=1   
21.     A = 0   
22.     while A < V: #iterate through A possibilities   
23.         A += 1   
24.         a = 0   
25.         attacks = [] #empty set for the attacker's capabilities   
26.         vectors = [] #empty set for potential attack vectors   
27.         while a < A: #generate set of attacker capabilities    
28.             z = randint(1,V)   




30.                 attacks.append(z)   
31.                 a += 1   
32.         for x in range(V): #generate size of X   
33.             X = x + 1   
34.             power_count = sum(1 for t in range(A) if attacks[t] <= X) #calculate power
   
35.             power = power_count * X    
36.             simp_power = X * X #calculate simple power"   
37.             if k == 1: #append to data file   
38.                 data00.append(A)   
39.                 data01.append(X)   
40.                 data03.append(simp_power)   
41.             data02.append(power)   
42.             if min(attacks) > X: #determine if successful attack possible   
43.                 data05.append(False)   
44.                 data04.append(A)   
45.             else:   
46.                 attempts = 0   
47.                 for t in range(A): #conduct attacks   
48.                     attempts += 1   
49.                     if attacks[t] <= X:   
50.                         data05.append(True)   
51.                         data04.append(attempts)   
52.                         break   
53.    
54.     if k == 1:   
55.         output.append(data00)   
56.         output.append(data01)   
57.         output.append(data03)   




59.     output.append(data04)   
60.     output.append(data05)   
61. b = open('test2.csv', 'w')   
62. add = csv.writer(b)   
63. add.writerows(output)   






Section 3: Step 3 code 
1. import numpy, scipy.io   
2. import csv   
3. from random import randint   
4. from random import uniform   
5. from random import shuffle   
6. from statistics import stdev   
7. from statistics import mean   
8. output = []   
9. i = 40 #iterations   
10. V = 40 #pool of vulnerabilities   
11. k = 0   
12. #clear output file   
13. output = []   
14. #conduct test   
15. data00 = ['Test A']   
16. data01 = ['Test X']   
17. data03 = ['Simplified Power']   
18. while k < i: #conduct i scenarios   
19.     data02 = ['Power']   
20.     data04 = ['Attempts']   
21.     data05 = ['Success']   
22.     k +=1   
23.     A = 0   
24.     while A < V: #iterate through A possibilities   
25.         A += 1   
26.         a = 0   
27.         attacks = [] #empty set for the attacker's capabilities   
28.         while a < A: #generate set of attacker capabilities    




30.             if z not in attacks:   
31.                 attacks.append(z)   
32.                 a += 1   
33.         for x in range(V): #generate size of X   
34.             X = x + 1   
35.             simp_power = X * X #calculate simple power"   
36.             if k == 1: #append to data file   
37.                 data00.append(A)   
38.                 data01.append(X)   
39.                 data03.append(simp_power)   
40.             y = 0   
41.             vulnerabilities = [] #empty set for potential attack vectors   
42.             while y < X: #generate set of vulnerabilities    
43.                 w = randint(1,V)   
44.                 if w not in vulnerabilities:   
45.                     vulnerabilities.append(w)   
46.                     y += 1   
47.             vectors = set(attacks).intersection(vulnerabilities) #generate vectors (P)   
48.             power_count = len(vectors) #calculate power   
49.             power = power_count * X    
50.             data02.append(power)   
51.             if not vectors: #determine if successful attack possible   
52.                 data05.append(False)   
53.                 data04.append(A)   
54.             else:   
55.                 attempts = 0   
56.                 for t in range(A): #conduct attacks   
57.                     attempts += 1   
58.                     if attacks[t] in vectors:   




60.                         data04.append(attempts)   
61.                         break   
62.     if k == 1:   
63.         output.append(data00)   
64.         output.append(data01)   
65.         output.append(data03)   
66.     output.append(data02)   
67.     output.append(data04)   
68.     output.append(data05)   
69. b = open('test3.csv', 'w')   
70. add = csv.writer(b)   
71. add.writerows(output)   





















Section 4: Step 4 code 
1. import numpy, scipy.io   
2. import csv   
3. from random import randint   
4. from random import uniform   
5. from random import shuffle   
6. from statistics import stdev   
7. from statistics import mean   
8. output = []   
9. i = 40 #iterations   
10. V = 40 #size of vulnerability pool   
11. k = 0   
12. #clear output file   
13. output = []   
14. #create vulnerability pool   
15. class Vulnerability(object):   
16.     def __init__(self, name, rarity, ability, difficulty):   
17.         self.name = name   
18.         self.rarity = rarity #probability that a vulnerability is present   
19.         self.ability = ability #probability that an attacker has this capability   
20.         self.difficulty = difficulty #amount of time needed to conduct attack   
21. class Result(object):   
22.     def __init__(self, size_X, size_A, success, time, power, power_simp):   
23.         self.size_X = size_X   
24.         self.size_A = size_A   
25.         self.success = success   
26.         self.time = time   
27.         self.power = power   
28.         self.power_simp = power_simp   




30. for v in range(V):   
31.     name = 'Vulnerability_'   
32.     name += str(v)   
33.     Vuln = Vulnerability(name, randint(1,99) / 100, randint(1,99) / 100 , randint(1,10
00))   
34.     #uniformly distributed random probabilities between 0.01 and 0.99,   
35.     #uniformly distributed random time between 1s and 1000s (to be modified)   
36.     V_set.append(Vuln)   
37. #conduct test   
38. data00 = ['Test A']   
39. data01 = ['Test X']   
40. data03 = ['Simplified Power']   
41. while k < i: #conduct i scenarios   
42.     data02 = ['Power']   
43.     data04 = ['Time']   
44.     data05 = ['Success']   
45.     k +=1   
46.     A = 0   
47.     while A < V: #iterate through A possibilities   
48.         A += 1   
49.         a = 0   
50.         attacks = [] #empty set for the attacker's capabilities   
51.         while a < A: #generate set of attacker capabilities    
52.             shuffle (V_set)   
53.             for item in V_set:   
54.                 z = uniform(0,1)   
55.                 if item.ability >= z and item not in attacks:   
56.                     attacks.append(item)   
57.                     a += 1   




59.         for x in range(V): #generate size of X   
60.             X = x + 1   
61.             times_calc = []   
62.             y = 0   
63.             vulnerabilities = [] #empty set for potential attack vectors   
64.             while y < X: #generate set of vulnerabilities   
65.                 shuffle(V_set)   
66.                 for item in V_set:   
67.                     w = uniform(0,1)   
68.                     if item.rarity >= w and item not in vulnerabilities:   
69.                         vulnerabilities.append(item)   
70.                         y += 1   
71.                         break   
72.             vectors = set(attacks).intersection(vulnerabilities) #generate vectors (P)   
73.             power_count = len(vectors) #calculate power   
74.             time = 0   
75.             if not vectors: #determine if successful attack possible   
76.                 for item in attacks:   
77.                     time += item.difficulty   
78.                 data05.append(False)   
79.                 data04.append(time)   
80.                 power = 0   
81.             else:   
82.                 shuffle(attacks)   
83.                 for item in attacks: #conduct attacks   
84.                     time += item.difficulty   
85.                     if item in vectors:   
86.                         data05.append(True)   
87.                         data04.append(time)   




89.                 for item in vectors:   
90.                     times_calc.append(item.difficulty)   
91.                 times = mean(times_calc)   
92.                 power = power_count * X / times   
93.                 simp_power = X * X / times #calculate simple power"   
94.             data02.append(power)   
95.     if k == 1:   
96.         data00.append(A)   
97.         data01.append(X)   
98.         data03.append(simp_power)   
99.         output.append(data00)   
100.         output.append(data01)   
101.         output.append(data03)   
102.     output.append(data02)   
103.     output.append(data04)   
104.     output.append(data05)   
105. b = open('test4.csv', 'w')   
106. add = csv.writer(b)   
107. add.writerows(output)   
108. b.close()   
 
Section 5: Code for Step 5 
1. import numpy, scipy.io   
2. import csv   
3. from random import randint   
4. from random import uniform   
5. from random import shuffle   
6. from statistics import stdev   
7. from statistics import mean   




9. i = 500 #iterations   
10. V = 27 #size of vulnerability pool   
11. k = 0   
12. #clear output file   
13. output = []   
14. #create vulnerability pool   
15. class Vulnerability(object):   
16.     def __init__(self, name, rarity, ability, difficulty):   
17.         self.name = name   
18.         self.rarity = rarity #probability that a vulnerability is present   
19.         self.ability = ability #probability that an attacker has this capability   
20.         self.difficulty = difficulty #amount of time needed to conduct attack   
21. class Scenario(object):   
22.     def __init__(self, name, vulnerabilities):   
23.         self.name = name   
24.         self.vulnerabilities = vulnerabilities   
25. class Result(object):   
26.     def __init__(self, name, power, success, time):   
27.         self.name = name   
28.         self.power = power   
29.         self.success = success   
30.         self.time = time   
31. V_set = [] #empty set of vulnerabilities   
32. Base = []   
33. for v in range(V):   
34.     name = 'Vulnerability_'   
35.     vu = v + 1   
36.     name += str(vu)   
37.     Vuln = Vulnerability(name, randint(1,500) / 1000, randint(1,500) / 1000 , randint




38.     if vu <= 9:   
39.         Vuln.ability = 0.001   
40.     elif 10 <= vu <=18:   
41.         Vuln.ability = 0.01   
42.     elif 19 <= vu <=27:   
43.         Vuln.ability = 0.1   
44.     if vu % 3 == 0 and vu < 28:   
45.         Vuln.difficulty = 1000   
46.     elif vu % 3 == 1 and vu < 28:   
47.         Vuln.difficulty = 100   
48.     elif vu % 3 == 2 and vu < 28:   
49.         Vuln.difficulty = 500   
50.     if 1 <= (vu % 9) <= 3 and vu < 28:   
51.         Vuln.rarity = 0.1   
52.     elif 4 <= (vu % 9) <= 6 and vu < 28:   
53.         Vuln.rarity = 0.3   
54.     elif not 1 <= (vu % 9) <= 6 and vu < 28:   
55.         Vuln.rarity = 0.5   
56.     if vu <=27:   
57.         Base.append(Vuln)   
58.     V_set.append(Vuln)   
59. #create scenarios   
60. scenarios = []   
61.    
62.    
63. vt = 0   
64. while vt <= 9:   
65.     vuln_set = []   
66.     if vt == 0:   




68.         scen = Scenario('Base', Base)   
69.     else:   
70.         name = 'Scenario_'   
71.         name += str(vt)   
72.         for item in Base:   
73.             if vt == 1 and item.difficulty < 1000:   
74.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
75.             if vt == 2 and not item.difficulty == 500:   
76.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
77.             if vt == 3 and item.difficulty > 100:   
78.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
79.             if vt == 4 and item.rarity < 0.5:   
80.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
81.             if vt == 5 and not item.rarity == 0.3:   
82.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
83.             if vt == 6 and item.rarity > 0.1:   
84.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
85.             if vt == 7 and item.ability < 0.1:   
86.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
87.             if vt == 8 and not item.ability == 0.01:   
88.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
89.             if vt == 9 and item.ability > 0.001:   
90.                 vuln_set.append(item)   
91.         scen = Scenario(name, vuln_set)   
92.     scenarios.append(scen)   
93.     vt += 1   
94.    
95. #conduct test   
96. while k < i: #conduct i scenarios   




98.     data01 = ['Power']   
99.     data02 = ['Success']   
100.     data03 = ['Time']   
101.     k +=1   
102.     shuffle (V_set)   
103.     attacks = []   
104.     results = []   
105.     for item in V_set:   
106.         z = uniform(1,1000) / 1000   
107.         if item.ability >= z and item not in attacks:   
108.             attacks.append(item)   
109.             break   
110. #Conduct tests   
111.     for item in scenarios:   
112.         vuln_set = item.vulnerabilities   
113.         vectors = set(attacks).intersection(vuln_set) #generate vectors (P)   
114.         power_count = len(vectors) #calculate power   
115.         name = item.name   
116.         if name == 'Scenario_1':   
117.             power = power_count * 18 / 300   
118.         elif name == 'Scenario_2':   
119.             power = power_count * 18 / 550   
120.         elif name == 'Scenario_3':   
121.             power = power_count * 18 / 750   
122.         elif name == 'Base':   
123.             power = power_count * 27 / 533   
124.         else:   
125.             power = power_count * 18 / 533   
126.         time = 0   




128.             success = False   
129.             time = 10000   
130.         else:   
131.             for item in attacks: #conduct attacks   
132.                 time += item.difficulty   
133.                 success = True   
134.                 time = time + 1000   
135.         res = Result(name, power, success, time)   
136.         results.append(res)   
137.     for item in results:   
138.         data00.append(item.name)   
139.         data01.append(item.power)   
140.         data02.append(item.success)   
141.         data03.append(item.time)   
142.     if k == 1:   
143.         output.append(data00)   
144.     output.append(data01)   
145.     output.append(data02)   
146.     output.append(data03)   
147. b = open('test5.csv', 'w')   
148. add = csv.writer(b)   
149. add.writerows(output)   
150. b.close()   
 
